Web3 · Smart Contract Audit

DeGods Security Audits

softstack has completed 8 smart contract audits for DeGods between October 2022 and October 2023, reporting 59 findings in total (4 high, 21 medium, 22 low and 12 informational). Every report is published in the softstack public audit archive.

Key facts

Client
DeGods
Audits completed
8
First audited
Latest audit
Languages
Solidity, Rust

About the project

DeGods is a profile-picture NFT collection created by Dust Labs, the team also behind the y00ts collection. It launched on Solana, and the collections have since been associated with deployments on Ethereum and Polygon. Dust Labs maintains Dust Protocol, the token infrastructure supporting the collections.

Findings

Combined across all 8 reviews softstack has completed for DeGods. Each report is broken out below.

0Critical
4High
21Medium
22Low
12Informational

Reports

Newest first. Every report covers its own scope and commit.

  1. DustLabs y00ts Bridge smart contract audit

    PDF
    0Critical
    0High
    0Medium
    0Low
    0Informational

    No security findings reported.

  2. DustLabs Season 3 & Points Parlor smart contract audit

    PDF
    0Critical
    0High
    4Medium
    3Low
    3Informational
    All 9 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    6.2.1Transfer Ignores Return Value

    The _withdraw function transfers arbitrary ERC20 and ERC721 token out of the contract. Both, the transfer function of ERC20 as well as the transferFrom function of ERC721 are returning a boolean, indicating if the transfer has been…

    Mediumfixed
    6.2.2Owner Can Withdraw Tokens (ERC20 and ERC721)

    By setting the backupAddress and calling adminWithdraw the owner of the contract can withdraw all ERC20 and ERC721 token hold by the contract at any time to an arbitrary address.

    Mediumacknowledged
    6.2.3Owner Can Pause Users Withdrawals

    The contract implements the pausable functionality of OpenZeppelin, which allows the owner of the contract to pause all user withdrawals at any time by calling pause function due to the whenNotPaused modifier of withdraw function.

    Mediumacknowledged
    6.2.4Unchecked Return Value For Transfers

    The _processPayment function transfers an owner-defined ERC20 token from the caller to the contract. The transfer function is returning a boolean, indicating if the transfer has been successful.

    Mediumfixed
    6.2.5Unprotected Initializer

    The logical contract of the PrizeVault has no protection against initialization by an attacker. It does not affect the functionality of the Proxy contract if it is called as it should be, but could lead to unintended behaviour if anybody…

    Lowfixed
    6.2.6Missing Zero Address Checks

    The owner function changeBackupAddress does not check for the zero address on changing the address. If the address is set to the zero address and the owner calls adminWithdraw, funds are lost forever.

    Lowacknowledged
    6.2.7Withdraw Function Can Run Out Of Gas

    The withdraw function is looping over data.details array to process withdrawals. If the size of this array is large, it can potentially lead to the transaction running out of gas.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.9Floating Pragma

    The current pragma Solidity directive is ^0.8.0; It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds.

    Informationalfixed
    6.2.10Documentation Mismatch

    The documentation mentions a function payForGenderSwitch which is not implemented in the

    Informationalfixed
  3. DustLabs Point Staking v2 smart contract audit

    · 2 files

    PDF
    0Critical
    2High
    4Medium
    2Low
    1Informational
    Scope

    Components reviewed

    2 modules · 2 files
    1. ERC721PointsStakingV1.sol
    2. ERC721PointsStakingV2.sol
    All 6 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    6.2.1Overpowered Manager/Owner Rights

    The contract manager can deduct any staking rewards by calling the spendPoints function. The manager is allowed to set any token reward point to zero.

    Highacknowledged
    6.2.2Owner Can Permanently Lock Staked NFTs

    The users can unstake their staked NFTs by calling the withdraw function. This function charges a unstakeFee paid with the related unstakeFeeToken (ERC20-Token).

    Highfixed
    6.2.7State Variable Could Be Marked As Constant

    The stakingToken variable is defined as normal state variable although it is set once during contract initialization and is never changed.

    Lowacknowledged
    6.2.8Not Emitting Events for Fee Updates

    The contract does not emit any events when updating stake and unstake fees. This makes it difficult for external parties, such as users or third-party services, to track changes in the fee structure.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.9Missing Function Modifiers

    The _stakeNft and _unstakeNft internal functions are missing function modifiers to ensure they are only called by the appropriate functions in the contract.

    Lowwont-fix
    6.2.10Unexplicit uint Types

    The current implementation uses the term uint for defining unsigned integers. This term is implicitly using the uint256.

    Informationalfixed
  4. Dust Labs DeBridge security assessment

    · 13 files

    PDF
    0Critical
    0High
    3Medium
    3Low
    3Informational
    Scope

    Components reviewed

    13 modules · 13 files
    1. totaldust-bridging/evm/src/nft/DefaultOperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol
    2. dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/DustWormholeERC721Upgradeable.sol
    3. dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/IOperatorFilterRegistry.sol
    4. dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol
    5. dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/lib/Constants.sol
    6. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/anchor_metadata.rs
    7. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/error.rs
    8. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instance.rs
    9. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/admin.rs
    10. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/burn_and_send.rs
    11. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/initialize.rs
    12. totaldust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/mod.rs
    13. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/lib.rs
    All 8 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    6.2.1Potential Loss Of Ownership

    The owner of a NFT token contract can be changed by calling transferOwnership function of OpenZeppeling Ownable implementation. This function directly sets the owner to the given address, if the address is not the zero address.

    Mediumfixed
    6.2.2Handle Edge Case In whitelist_bytes Function

    The whitelist_bytes function might produce a wrong size for the whitelist vector when the collection_size is not divisible by 8, potentially causing issues in the whitelist vector's functionality.

    Mediumfixed
    6.2.3Missing State Variable Visibility

    In the current implementation several state variables are missing an explicit visibility modifier. By default all state variables have public visibility and auto generate view functions.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.4Improve Registry Contract Detection Using ERC165

    Enhance the detection of the registry contract by leveraging the ERC165 standard for interface detection Currently, the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable contract checks the presence of the registry contract by verifying the code length at a…

    Lowfixed
    6.2.5Out-of-Bounds Access Risk

    The is_whitelisted function in instance.rs might access an out-of-bounds index in the whitelist vector if token_id is greater than or equal to collection_size.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.6Floating Pragma

    The current pragma Solidity directive is floating. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds.

    Informationalacknowledged
    6.2.7if-else Statement

    Improve code readability by splitting if-else statement into separate if statements with clear comments In the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol contract, the nested if-else statement in lines 29- 37 might be confusing and difficult to read.

    Informationalacknowledged
    6.2.8Descriptive Error Message

    Improve consistency and debugging by using a require statement with a descriptive error message In the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol contract, the onlyAllowedOperator modifier uses a custom error instead of a require statement with a…

    Informationalacknowledged
  5. DustLabs Point Staking smart contract audit

    · 1 file

    PDF
    0Critical
    2High
    4Medium
    2Low
    1Informational
    Scope

    Components reviewed

    1 module · 1 file
    1. ERC721PointsStakingV1.sol
    All 5 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    6.2.1Overpowered Manager/Owner Rights

    The contract manager can deduct any staking rewards by calling the spendPoints function. The manager is allowed to set any token reward point to zero.

    Highwont-fix
    6.2.2Owner Can Permanently Lock Staked NFTs

    The users can unstake their staked NFTs by calling the withdraw function. This function charges a unstakeFee paid with the related unstakeFeeToken (ERC20-Token).

    Highwont-fix
    6.2.7State Variable Could Be Marked As Constant

    The stakingToken variable is defined as normal state variable although it is set once during contract initialization and is never changed.

    Lowwont-fix
    6.2.8Not Emitting Events for Fee Updates

    The contract does not emit any events when updating stake and unstake fees. This makes it difficult for external parties, such as users or third-party services, to track changes in the fee structure.

    Lowwont-fix
    6.2.9Unexplicit uint Types

    The current implementation uses the term uint for defining unsigned integers. This term is implicitly using the uint256.

    Informationalwont-fix
  6. Dust Labs DustBridging security assessment

    · 13 files

    PDF
    0Critical
    0High
    3Medium
    3Low
    3Informational

    0 of 9 resolved

    Scope

    Components reviewed

    13 modules · 13 files
    1. totaldust-bridging/evm/src/nft/DefaultOperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol
    2. dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/DustWormholeERC721Upgradeable.sol
    3. dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/IOperatorFilterRegistry.sol
    4. dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol
    5. dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/lib/Constants.sol
    6. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/anchor_metadata.rs
    7. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/error.rs
    8. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instance.rs
    9. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/admin.rs
    10. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/burn_and_send.rs
    11. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/initialize.rs
    12. totaldust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/mod.rs
    13. dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/lib.rs
    All 9 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    6.2.1Potential Loss Of Ownership

    The owner of a NFT token contract can be changed by calling transferOwnership function of OpenZeppeling Ownable implementation. This function directly sets the owner to the given address, if the address is not the zero address.

    Mediumwont-fix
    6.2.2Ensure Metadata Initialization With Manual Check

    Add a manual check to ensure that the metadata has been initialized before proceeding with the initialize function.

    Mediumwont-fix
    6.2.3Handle Edge Case In whitelist_bytes Function

    The whitelist_bytes function might produce a wrong size for the whitelist vector when the collection_size is not divisible by 8, potentially causing issues in the whitelist vector's functionality.

    Mediumwont-fix
    6.2.4Missing State Variable Visibility

    In the current implementation several state variables are missing an explicit visibility modifier. By default all state variables have public visibility and auto generate view functions.

    Lowwont-fix
    6.2.5Improve Registry Contract Detection Using ERC165

    Enhance the detection of the registry contract by leveraging the ERC165 standard for interface detection Currently, the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable contract checks the presence of the registry contract by verifying the code length at a…

    Lowwont-fix
    6.2.6Out-of-Bounds Access Risk

    The is_whitelisted function in instance.rs might access an out-of-bounds index in the whitelist vector if token_id is greater than or equal to collection_size.

    Lowwont-fix
    6.2.7Floating Pragma

    The current pragma Solidity directive is floating. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds.

    Informationalwont-fix
    6.2.8if-else Statement

    Improve code readability by splitting if-else statement into separate if statements with clear comments In the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol contract, the nested if-else statement in lines 29- 37 might be confusing and difficult to read.

    Informationalwont-fix
    6.2.9Descriptive Error Message

    Improve consistency and debugging by using a require statement with a descriptive error message In the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol contract, the onlyAllowedOperator modifier uses a custom error instead of a require statement with a…

    Informationalwont-fix
  7. Dust Labs Dusties Protocol SOLANA program audit

    · 19 files

    PDF
    0Critical
    0High
    1Medium
    3Low
    0Informational

    0 of 4 resolved

    ScopeSource repositorygithub.com/rust-lang/rust

    Components reviewed

    14 modules · 19 files
    1. add_currency_token_to_allowlist.rs
    2. add_nft_collection_to_allowlist.rs
    3. auction_strategy.rs
    4. bid_strategy.rs
    5. raffle_strategy.rs
    6. random_utils.rs
    7. revenue_distribution.rs
    8. programs/dusties/src/admin/add_currency_token_to_allowlist.rs
    9. Lprograms/dusties/src/admin/add_nft_collection_to_allowlist.rs
    10. Lprograms/dusties/src/common/auction_strategy.rs
    11. -115Lprograms/dusties/src/common/bid_strategy.rs
    12. Lprograms/dusties/src/common/raffle_strategy.rs
    13. Lprograms/dusties/src/common/random_utils.rs
    14. Lprograms/dusties/src/common/revenue_distribution.rs
    All 4 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    6.2.1Integer Overflow and Underflow

    Do not use unchecked arithmetic operations. Unchecked operations can lead to integer overflow or underflow.

    Mediumwont-fix
    6.2.2Timestamp Dependencies

    Auctions and raffles use mock_timestamp which is normally used in the test environments. The value is set by the admin function - set_mock_timestamp.

    Lowwont-fix
    6.2.3Compiler Error

    Compile error occurred on rustc 1.67.0 / anchor 0.26.0 version.

    Lowwont-fix
    6.2.4Methods Execution Permissions (Access Control)

    The global PDA initializer can still initialize, as long as the program deployer didn’t init. Of course, it can be closed by the deployer (update_authority) but may need to change the global PDA seed, because we can’t create a PDA on the…

    Lowwont-fix
  8. DUST Protocol program audit

    PDF
    0Critical
    0High
    2Medium
    6Low
    1Informational

    0 of 9 resolved

    All 9 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    6.2.1The Farm Manager Can Lock The Farmer’s Stakes

    The update_farm instruction is used to update the farm’s config. The farm manager is able to update min_staking_period_sec, cooldown_period_sec and unstaking_fee_lamp to any value without any restrictions.

    Mediumacknowledged
    6.2.2The Bank Manager Can Lock The Vault’s Funds

    The set_vault_lock and the set_bank_flags instructions allow the bank manager to lock any vault or freeze them at once, preventing the vault owner from depositing/ withdrawing their gems.

    Mediumacknowledged
    6.2.3The Farm Can End Up Without A Manager

    When calling the update_farm instruction, there is a possibility that the farm manager sets a wrong address as a new manager, which can result in the farm having no manager.

    Lowacknowledged
    6.2.4The authorized_funder_count Attribute Can Get Desynchronized

    The authorize_funder instruction makes use of init_if_needed in the authorization_proof account. If the account is already initialized, the authorized_funder_count attribute will be incremented without adding a funder.

    Lowacknowledged
    6.2.5The Bank Can End Up Without A Manager

    When calling the update_bank_manager instruction, there is a possibility that the bank manager sets a wrong address as a new_manager, leaving the bank without a manager, which can disable some functionalities.

    Lowacknowledged
    6.2.6The Vault Can End Up Without An Owner

    When calling the update_vault_owner instruction, there is a possibility that the vault owner sets a wrong address as a new_owner, which can result in the vault having no owner, and the funds getting locked.

    Lowacknowledged
    6.2.7The whitelisted_creators And The whitelisted_mints Attributes Can Get Desynchronized

    The add_to_whitelist instruction makes use of init_if_needed in the whitelist_proof account. If the account is already initialized, the whitelisted_creators or the whitelisted_mints attribute will be incremented without adding a new…

    Lowacknowledged
    6.2.8The gem_box_count Attribute Can Get Desynchronized

    The deposit_gem instruction makes use of init_if_needed in the gem_box account. If the account is already initialized, the gem_box_count attribute will be incremented without adding a new gem box.

    Lowacknowledged
    6.2.9The Bank Access Is Not Verified Before Creating A Vault

    The bank manager can lock/unlock specific vaults, controlling whether the vault owners are allowed to withdraw/deposit gems. Has also has the option of freezing all vaults at the same time using the bank flags.

    Informationalacknowledged

About this engagement

A smart contract audit reviews on-chain code for flaws an attacker could exploit. Engineers trace how assets move through the contracts, check who can call privileged functions, and test the arithmetic, external calls and upgrade paths. Each finding is rated by severity, and fixes are re-checked before the final report.

How softstack runs smart contract audits

Methodology

Review process

  1. Scoping and threat modelling

    The commit hash is frozen and the attack surface is mapped: asset flows, trust assumptions, privileged roles and the external systems the code depends on.

  2. Automated analysis

    Static analysers sweep the full codebase to surface known weakness patterns, unreachable states and deviations from established conventions.

  3. Manual code review

    Independent engineers read the code line by line, concentrating on business logic, access control, arithmetic and the handling of external calls.

  4. Adversarial testing

    Property-based fuzzing and invariant tests attack the assumptions the protocol relies on, targeting states that ordinary unit tests never reach.

  5. Reporting

    Every finding is documented with a severity rating, its impact, the steps to reproduce it and a concrete remediation the team can act on.

  6. Remediation verification

    Submitted fixes are re-reviewed against the original finding, and the final report records the resolved state of each one.

Standards and references

  • SWC RegistrySmart Contract Weakness Classification
  • CWECommon Weakness Enumeration

FAQ

DeGods was audited by softstack GmbH, a German Web3 security and software company based in Flensburg and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 by TÜV SÜD. softstack has completed 8 smart contract audits for DeGods between October 2022 and October 2023. The published reports are linked on this page and in the softstack public audit archive.

8 separate reviews, the first in October 2022 and the most recent in October 2023. Each one covers its own scope and commit, and is listed individually on this page.

59 findings across all 8 reviews: 4 high, 21 medium, 22 low and 12 informational.

Each report covers the code as it stood at the commit it names, the most recent in October 2023. Any code changed after that point is outside the reviewed scope.

Related audits

Browse all security audits

Disclaimer

This audit represents a point-in-time security assessment of the reviewed codebase and is intended for informational purposes only. While Softstack applies industry-standard security review methodologies, no audit can guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities, bugs, or other security risks. This report does not constitute financial, legal, regulatory, or investment advice, nor does it endorse the project, its business model, products, or services. Security is an ongoing process, and we strongly recommend conducting a new assessment following any material code changes or at least every 6 months to address newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and ecosystem developments.