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Web3 · Smart Contract Audit
DeGods Security Audits
softstack has completed 8 smart contract audits for DeGods between October 2022 and October 2023, reporting 59 findings in total (4 high, 21 medium, 22 low and 12 informational). Every report is published in the softstack public audit archive.
Key facts
- Client
- DeGods
- Audits completed
- 8
- First audited
- Latest audit
- Languages
- Solidity, Rust
About the project
DeGods is a profile-picture NFT collection created by Dust Labs, the team also behind the y00ts collection. It launched on Solana, and the collections have since been associated with deployments on Ethereum and Polygon. Dust Labs maintains Dust Protocol, the token infrastructure supporting the collections.
Findings
Combined across all 8 reviews softstack has completed for DeGods. Each report is broken out below.
Reports
Newest first. Every report covers its own scope and commit.
DustLabs y00ts Bridge smart contract audit
0Critical0High0Medium0Low0InformationalNo security findings reported.
DustLabs Season 3 & Points Parlor smart contract audit
0Critical0High4Medium3Low3InformationalAll 9 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Transfer Ignores Return Value The _withdraw function transfers arbitrary ERC20 and ERC721 token out of the contract. Both, the transfer function of ERC20 as well as the transferFrom function of ERC721 are returning a boolean, indicating if the transfer has been…
Medium fixed 6.2.2Owner Can Withdraw Tokens (ERC20 and ERC721) By setting the backupAddress and calling adminWithdraw the owner of the contract can withdraw all ERC20 and ERC721 token hold by the contract at any time to an arbitrary address.
Medium acknowledged 6.2.3Owner Can Pause Users Withdrawals The contract implements the pausable functionality of OpenZeppelin, which allows the owner of the contract to pause all user withdrawals at any time by calling pause function due to the whenNotPaused modifier of withdraw function.
Medium acknowledged 6.2.4Unchecked Return Value For Transfers The _processPayment function transfers an owner-defined ERC20 token from the caller to the contract. The transfer function is returning a boolean, indicating if the transfer has been successful.
Medium fixed 6.2.5Unprotected Initializer The logical contract of the PrizeVault has no protection against initialization by an attacker. It does not affect the functionality of the Proxy contract if it is called as it should be, but could lead to unintended behaviour if anybody…
Low fixed 6.2.6Missing Zero Address Checks The owner function changeBackupAddress does not check for the zero address on changing the address. If the address is set to the zero address and the owner calls adminWithdraw, funds are lost forever.
Low acknowledged 6.2.7Withdraw Function Can Run Out Of Gas The withdraw function is looping over data.details array to process withdrawals. If the size of this array is large, it can potentially lead to the transaction running out of gas.
Low fixed 6.2.9Floating Pragma The current pragma Solidity directive is ^0.8.0; It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds.
Informational fixed 6.2.10Documentation Mismatch The documentation mentions a function payForGenderSwitch which is not implemented in the
Informational fixed DustLabs Point Staking v2 smart contract audit
0Critical2High4Medium2Low1InformationalScope
Components reviewed
2 modules · 2 files- ERC721PointsStakingV1.sol
- ERC721PointsStakingV2.sol
All 6 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Overpowered Manager/Owner Rights The contract manager can deduct any staking rewards by calling the spendPoints function. The manager is allowed to set any token reward point to zero.
High acknowledged 6.2.2Owner Can Permanently Lock Staked NFTs The users can unstake their staked NFTs by calling the withdraw function. This function charges a unstakeFee paid with the related unstakeFeeToken (ERC20-Token).
High fixed 6.2.7State Variable Could Be Marked As Constant The stakingToken variable is defined as normal state variable although it is set once during contract initialization and is never changed.
Low acknowledged 6.2.8Not Emitting Events for Fee Updates The contract does not emit any events when updating stake and unstake fees. This makes it difficult for external parties, such as users or third-party services, to track changes in the fee structure.
Low fixed 6.2.9Missing Function Modifiers The _stakeNft and _unstakeNft internal functions are missing function modifiers to ensure they are only called by the appropriate functions in the contract.
Low wont-fix 6.2.10Unexplicit uint Types The current implementation uses the term uint for defining unsigned integers. This term is implicitly using the uint256.
Informational fixed Dust Labs DeBridge security assessment
0Critical0High3Medium3Low3InformationalScope
Components reviewed
13 modules · 13 files- totaldust-bridging/evm/src/nft/DefaultOperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol
- dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/DustWormholeERC721Upgradeable.sol
- dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/IOperatorFilterRegistry.sol
- dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol
- dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/lib/Constants.sol
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/anchor_metadata.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/error.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instance.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/admin.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/burn_and_send.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/initialize.rs
- totaldust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/mod.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/lib.rs
All 8 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Potential Loss Of Ownership The owner of a NFT token contract can be changed by calling transferOwnership function of OpenZeppeling Ownable implementation. This function directly sets the owner to the given address, if the address is not the zero address.
Medium fixed 6.2.2Handle Edge Case In whitelist_bytes Function The whitelist_bytes function might produce a wrong size for the whitelist vector when the collection_size is not divisible by 8, potentially causing issues in the whitelist vector's functionality.
Medium fixed 6.2.3Missing State Variable Visibility In the current implementation several state variables are missing an explicit visibility modifier. By default all state variables have public visibility and auto generate view functions.
Low fixed 6.2.4Improve Registry Contract Detection Using ERC165 Enhance the detection of the registry contract by leveraging the ERC165 standard for interface detection Currently, the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable contract checks the presence of the registry contract by verifying the code length at a…
Low fixed 6.2.5Out-of-Bounds Access Risk The is_whitelisted function in instance.rs might access an out-of-bounds index in the whitelist vector if token_id is greater than or equal to collection_size.
Low fixed 6.2.6Floating Pragma The current pragma Solidity directive is floating. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds.
Informational acknowledged 6.2.7if-else Statement Improve code readability by splitting if-else statement into separate if statements with clear comments In the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol contract, the nested if-else statement in lines 29- 37 might be confusing and difficult to read.
Informational acknowledged 6.2.8Descriptive Error Message Improve consistency and debugging by using a require statement with a descriptive error message In the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol contract, the onlyAllowedOperator modifier uses a custom error instead of a require statement with a…
Informational acknowledged DustLabs Point Staking smart contract audit
0Critical2High4Medium2Low1InformationalScope
Components reviewed
1 module · 1 file- ERC721PointsStakingV1.sol
All 5 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Overpowered Manager/Owner Rights The contract manager can deduct any staking rewards by calling the spendPoints function. The manager is allowed to set any token reward point to zero.
High wont-fix 6.2.2Owner Can Permanently Lock Staked NFTs The users can unstake their staked NFTs by calling the withdraw function. This function charges a unstakeFee paid with the related unstakeFeeToken (ERC20-Token).
High wont-fix 6.2.7State Variable Could Be Marked As Constant The stakingToken variable is defined as normal state variable although it is set once during contract initialization and is never changed.
Low wont-fix 6.2.8Not Emitting Events for Fee Updates The contract does not emit any events when updating stake and unstake fees. This makes it difficult for external parties, such as users or third-party services, to track changes in the fee structure.
Low wont-fix 6.2.9Unexplicit uint Types The current implementation uses the term uint for defining unsigned integers. This term is implicitly using the uint256.
Informational wont-fix Dust Labs DustBridging security assessment
0Critical0High3Medium3Low3Informational0 of 9 resolved
Scope
Components reviewed
13 modules · 13 files- totaldust-bridging/evm/src/nft/DefaultOperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol
- dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/DustWormholeERC721Upgradeable.sol
- dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/IOperatorFilterRegistry.sol
- dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol
- dust-bridging/evm/src/nft/lib/Constants.sol
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/anchor_metadata.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/error.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instance.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/admin.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/burn_and_send.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/initialize.rs
- totaldust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/instructions/mod.rs
- dust-bridging/solana/programs/dust_bridging/src/lib.rs
All 9 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Potential Loss Of Ownership The owner of a NFT token contract can be changed by calling transferOwnership function of OpenZeppeling Ownable implementation. This function directly sets the owner to the given address, if the address is not the zero address.
Medium wont-fix 6.2.2Ensure Metadata Initialization With Manual Check Add a manual check to ensure that the metadata has been initialized before proceeding with the initialize function.
Medium wont-fix 6.2.3Handle Edge Case In whitelist_bytes Function The whitelist_bytes function might produce a wrong size for the whitelist vector when the collection_size is not divisible by 8, potentially causing issues in the whitelist vector's functionality.
Medium wont-fix 6.2.4Missing State Variable Visibility In the current implementation several state variables are missing an explicit visibility modifier. By default all state variables have public visibility and auto generate view functions.
Low wont-fix 6.2.5Improve Registry Contract Detection Using ERC165 Enhance the detection of the registry contract by leveraging the ERC165 standard for interface detection Currently, the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable contract checks the presence of the registry contract by verifying the code length at a…
Low wont-fix 6.2.6Out-of-Bounds Access Risk The is_whitelisted function in instance.rs might access an out-of-bounds index in the whitelist vector if token_id is greater than or equal to collection_size.
Low wont-fix 6.2.7Floating Pragma The current pragma Solidity directive is floating. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds.
Informational wont-fix 6.2.8if-else Statement Improve code readability by splitting if-else statement into separate if statements with clear comments In the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol contract, the nested if-else statement in lines 29- 37 might be confusing and difficult to read.
Informational wont-fix 6.2.9Descriptive Error Message Improve consistency and debugging by using a require statement with a descriptive error message In the OperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol contract, the onlyAllowedOperator modifier uses a custom error instead of a require statement with a…
Informational wont-fix Dust Labs Dusties Protocol SOLANA program audit
0Critical0High1Medium3Low0Informational0 of 4 resolved
Scope
Source repositorygithub.com/rust-lang/rustComponents reviewed
14 modules · 19 files- add_currency_token_to_allowlist.rs
- add_nft_collection_to_allowlist.rs
- auction_strategy.rs
- bid_strategy.rs
- raffle_strategy.rs
- random_utils.rs
- revenue_distribution.rs
- programs/dusties/src/admin/add_currency_token_to_allowlist.rs
- Lprograms/dusties/src/admin/add_nft_collection_to_allowlist.rs
- Lprograms/dusties/src/common/auction_strategy.rs
- -115Lprograms/dusties/src/common/bid_strategy.rs
- Lprograms/dusties/src/common/raffle_strategy.rs
- Lprograms/dusties/src/common/random_utils.rs
- Lprograms/dusties/src/common/revenue_distribution.rs
All 4 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Integer Overflow and Underflow Do not use unchecked arithmetic operations. Unchecked operations can lead to integer overflow or underflow.
Medium wont-fix 6.2.2Timestamp Dependencies Auctions and raffles use mock_timestamp which is normally used in the test environments. The value is set by the admin function - set_mock_timestamp.
Low wont-fix 6.2.3Compiler Error Compile error occurred on rustc 1.67.0 / anchor 0.26.0 version.
Low wont-fix 6.2.4Methods Execution Permissions (Access Control) The global PDA initializer can still initialize, as long as the program deployer didn’t init. Of course, it can be closed by the deployer (update_authority) but may need to change the global PDA seed, because we can’t create a PDA on the…
Low wont-fix DUST Protocol program audit
0Critical0High2Medium6Low1Informational0 of 9 resolved
All 9 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1The Farm Manager Can Lock The Farmer’s Stakes The update_farm instruction is used to update the farm’s config. The farm manager is able to update min_staking_period_sec, cooldown_period_sec and unstaking_fee_lamp to any value without any restrictions.
Medium acknowledged 6.2.2The Bank Manager Can Lock The Vault’s Funds The set_vault_lock and the set_bank_flags instructions allow the bank manager to lock any vault or freeze them at once, preventing the vault owner from depositing/ withdrawing their gems.
Medium acknowledged 6.2.3The Farm Can End Up Without A Manager When calling the update_farm instruction, there is a possibility that the farm manager sets a wrong address as a new manager, which can result in the farm having no manager.
Low acknowledged 6.2.4The authorized_funder_count Attribute Can Get Desynchronized The authorize_funder instruction makes use of init_if_needed in the authorization_proof account. If the account is already initialized, the authorized_funder_count attribute will be incremented without adding a funder.
Low acknowledged 6.2.5The Bank Can End Up Without A Manager When calling the update_bank_manager instruction, there is a possibility that the bank manager sets a wrong address as a new_manager, leaving the bank without a manager, which can disable some functionalities.
Low acknowledged 6.2.6The Vault Can End Up Without An Owner When calling the update_vault_owner instruction, there is a possibility that the vault owner sets a wrong address as a new_owner, which can result in the vault having no owner, and the funds getting locked.
Low acknowledged 6.2.7The whitelisted_creators And The whitelisted_mints Attributes Can Get Desynchronized The add_to_whitelist instruction makes use of init_if_needed in the whitelist_proof account. If the account is already initialized, the whitelisted_creators or the whitelisted_mints attribute will be incremented without adding a new…
Low acknowledged 6.2.8The gem_box_count Attribute Can Get Desynchronized The deposit_gem instruction makes use of init_if_needed in the gem_box account. If the account is already initialized, the gem_box_count attribute will be incremented without adding a new gem box.
Low acknowledged 6.2.9The Bank Access Is Not Verified Before Creating A Vault The bank manager can lock/unlock specific vaults, controlling whether the vault owners are allowed to withdraw/deposit gems. Has also has the option of freezing all vaults at the same time using the bank flags.
Informational acknowledged
About this engagement
A smart contract audit reviews on-chain code for flaws an attacker could exploit. Engineers trace how assets move through the contracts, check who can call privileged functions, and test the arithmetic, external calls and upgrade paths. Each finding is rated by severity, and fixes are re-checked before the final report.
How softstack runs smart contract auditsMethodology
Review process
Scoping and threat modelling
The commit hash is frozen and the attack surface is mapped: asset flows, trust assumptions, privileged roles and the external systems the code depends on.
Automated analysis
Static analysers sweep the full codebase to surface known weakness patterns, unreachable states and deviations from established conventions.
Manual code review
Independent engineers read the code line by line, concentrating on business logic, access control, arithmetic and the handling of external calls.
Adversarial testing
Property-based fuzzing and invariant tests attack the assumptions the protocol relies on, targeting states that ordinary unit tests never reach.
Reporting
Every finding is documented with a severity rating, its impact, the steps to reproduce it and a concrete remediation the team can act on.
Remediation verification
Submitted fixes are re-reviewed against the original finding, and the final report records the resolved state of each one.
Standards and references
- SWC RegistrySmart Contract Weakness Classification
- CWECommon Weakness Enumeration
FAQ
DeGods was audited by softstack GmbH, a German Web3 security and software company based in Flensburg and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 by TÜV SÜD. softstack has completed 8 smart contract audits for DeGods between October 2022 and October 2023. The published reports are linked on this page and in the softstack public audit archive.
8 separate reviews, the first in October 2022 and the most recent in October 2023. Each one covers its own scope and commit, and is listed individually on this page.
59 findings across all 8 reviews: 4 high, 21 medium, 22 low and 12 informational.
Each report covers the code as it stood at the commit it names, the most recent in October 2023. Any code changed after that point is outside the reviewed scope.
Related audits
Browse all security auditsDisclaimer
This audit represents a point-in-time security assessment of the reviewed codebase and is intended for informational purposes only. While Softstack applies industry-standard security review methodologies, no audit can guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities, bugs, or other security risks. This report does not constitute financial, legal, regulatory, or investment advice, nor does it endorse the project, its business model, products, or services. Security is an ongoing process, and we strongly recommend conducting a new assessment following any material code changes or at least every 6 months to address newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and ecosystem developments.