Web3 · Smart Contract Audit

FRGMNT Security Audit

softstack completed a smart contract audit of FRGMNT's fUSD and fEURO stablecoin protocol in October 2026, reporting 20 findings (14 medium and 6 low), of which 19 were resolved or mitigated before the final report. The full report is published in the softstack public audit archive.

Key facts

Client
FRGMNT
Completed
Chains
Base
Languages
Solidity, TypeScript
Commit
dde19f8

About the project

FRGMNT is a multi-collateralised stablecoin protocol deployed on Base. Users deposit supported dollar stablecoins and receive fUSD, a transferable token pegged to the US dollar. fEURO, a euro-pegged stablecoin, runs on the same protocol infrastructure and was reviewed alongside fUSD. Staking fUSD issues sfUSD, which accrues yield from a vault that allocates collateral across on-chain stablecoin strategies. The project has partnered with Anchorage Digital for institutional access to fUSD.

Case study

Scope

Source repositorygithub.com/frgmnt-dao/Frgmnt_fUSD

Components reviewed

14 modules · 61 files
  1. AaveLendingPoolAssetGuard.sol
  2. AaveV3LendingPoolSelectiveAssetGuard.sol
  3. AaveV4SpokeSelectiveAssetGuard.sol
  4. AaveV4TokenizationAssetGuard.sol
  5. MorphoBlueLendingPoolAssetGuard.sol
  6. MorphoBlueLendingPoolSelectiveAssetGuard.sol
  7. MorphoVaultV2AssetGuard.sol
  8. AaveLendingPoolGuardV3.sol
  9. AaveV4SpokeContractGuard.sol
  10. AaveV4TokenizationContractGuard.sol
  11. MorphoBlueContractGuard.sol
  12. MorphoBlueManager.sol
  13. MorphoVaultV2ContractGuard.sol
  14. IAggregatorV3Interface.sol

Findings

0Critical
0High
14Medium
6Low
0Informational

19 of 20 findings resolved before the final report.

IDTitleSeverityStatus
6.2.1Fresh-deployment script leaves the deployer as owner of all three Transparent proxy ProxyAdmins

PoolLogic, PoolManagerLogic and AssetHandler are Transparent proxies, each with its own ProxyAdmin.

Mediumfixed
6.2.2execTransaction missing nonReentrant: cross- function reentrancy via callback-exempt manager

execTransaction is the sole external state-mutating function on PoolLogic that lacks nonReentrant. All 13 other external state-mutating entrypoints carry the modifier.

Mediumfixed
6.2.3executeOperation missing nonReentrant: partial NAV reentrancy during Aave flashloan unwind

PoolLogic.executeOperation carries no nonReentrant modifier. The transaction loop inside PoolLogicFlashloanAave executes arbitrary external calls.

Mediumfixed
6.2.4onMorphoFlashLoan missing nonReentrant: partial NAV reentrancy during Morpho flashloan unwind

The Morpho Blue flashloan path has the same nonReentrant gap as the Aave path (F-PLFA-001). onMorphoFlashLoan is external override with no nonReentrant modifier.

Mediumfixed
6.2.6Hub-wide liquidity overstatement in AaveV4SpokeAssetGuard: per- Spoke cross-pool capping absent

Re-verification note (final review, 12 October): this section consolidates the former Aave V4 Spoke TOCTOU finding (validated as F-AV4-001) with the per-call-frame ledger gap (F-005).

Mediumacknowledged
6.2.7withdrawalSlippageBps dual-use: spot-TWAP deviation gate and LP output slippage share one threshold

withdrawalSlippageBps (default 100 bps, max 2000 bps) is used for two independent purposes. First, it gates the TWAP oracle check: if spot deviates from the 10-minute TWAP by more than withdrawalSlippageBps, the withdrawal reverts.

Mediumfixed
6.2.8UniswapV3SelectiveAssetGuard inherits withdrawalSlippageBps dual- use

UniswapV3SelectiveAssetGuard inherits _checkSpotPriceDeviation from UniswapV3AssetGuard without overriding it, inheriting the same dual-use parameter conflict described in F-014. Selective withdrawal paths are equally exposed.

Mediumfixed
6.2.9AaveLendingPoolAssetGuard: unconfigured collateral swap route causes permanent pool-wide DoS

Re-verification note (final review, 12 October): reclassified from High. The trigger is a trusted-role configuration gap (a manager adds an Aave collateral asset while the owner has not configured its swap route, with any debt…

Mediumfixed
6.2.10UniswapV3RouterGuard does not validate amountOutMinimum on manager swaps

All four branches of txGuard (exactInput, exactInputSingle, exactOutput, exactOutputSingle) validate that the destination asset is supported and the recipient is the pool, but impose no check on params.amountOutMinimum (or…

Mediumfixed
6.2.11Contracts that the documents call protocol-owned are owned by the pool manager Safe, so the manager can move the pool's USDC out through a Morpho market it…

docs/contracts/MorphoBlueManager.md states that the owner is the protocol owner (intended to be the Timelock) and describes the market allowlist as a second, independent, protocol-owner-only approval step that stops a manager from…

Mediumfixed
6.2.12The Uniswap router guard validates only the first and last token of a multi-hop path, and PoolLogic.execTransaction is unlocked, so a manager or trader can…

A manager or trader sends an exactOutput swap whose path runs through a token it controls (USDC, HOP, USDC). The guard checks that the destination is a supported asset and the recipient is the pool, and it never inspects the middle token.

Mediumfixed
6.2.13The manager can act as any user on deposit, stake, unstake and immediate withdrawal by listing a contract as a callback sender

Both _actionSender helpers replace msg.sender with IUserActionSender(sender).actionUser() whenever the sender is on the pool's callback allowlist. The intended member is FrgmntUserActions, which sets actionUser to its own caller.

Mediumfixed
6.2.15Reference attester service lets the requesting user choose which assets a plan draws from

Section 3.1 of the design document explains why a user must not choose the asset mix of a withdrawal: each rational user takes the healthiest and most liquid assets first and leaves the impaired or illiquid ones to whoever exits later,…

Lowfixed
6.2.16A token-only plan in a pool with a debt-bearing position leaves accountedAssets below the gross NAV, so the next accrual mints a fee and rewards from the…

accountedAssets is the high-water mark used to recognize yield. A plan withdrawal lowers it by the value taken out plus the leaving claims' share of the existing overhang (the FNA-42 remediation), computed through…

Lowfixed
6.2.17A dust queued request lets any fUSD holder block plan draws of a deposit asset in queue mode

A plan may not draw an asset that has Pending queued withdrawal requests, so a plan cannot starve finalization.

Lowfixed
6.2.18The attested-only upgrade path leaves validated protections inactive and cannot be completed by the core upgrade script

Two scripts can upgrade the live PoolLogic. The core script upgrades PoolLogic, TokenLogic, AssetHandler and PoolManagerLogic in one atomic Safe batch of nine calls.

Lowfixed
6.2.19A floored NAV hides a direct-leg over-draw when the deficit comes from another guard

completeFundValue is the sum of the guard balances minus the sum of the guard deficits, floored at zero. The plan's two NAV bounds are measured on it before and after the allocation loop.

Lowfixed
6.2.20The emergency stop is not independent of the manager, or arrives after a rotation matures, in configurations the repository's own scripts produce

The factoryOwner's latched stop is the only control of the attested-withdrawal feature that does not depend on the manager (design document section 3.9).

Lowfixed
6.2.5Fee unit-of-account mismatch in FundCalculationLibrary fee summation

calculateManagementFee at line 61 computes the fee as a fraction of the raw fUSD token supply: managementFee = (_totalFusd * _managementFeeNumerator * dt) / _feeDenominator / 365 days calculatePerformanceFee at line 36 returns a value…

Mediumfixed
6.2.14Liquidity provision through the Uniswap guard has no loss accounting beyond a price band of about 1 percent, so a trader can sandwich the pool's own mints…

The guard lets the manager or the trader mint a position or add liquidity for the pool when the pool's spot price is inside a band around the Chainlink fair price.

Mediumfixed

About this engagement

A smart contract audit reviews on-chain code for flaws an attacker could exploit. Engineers trace how assets move through the contracts, check who can call privileged functions, and test the arithmetic, external calls and upgrade paths. Each finding is rated by severity, and fixes are re-checked before the final report.

How softstack runs smart contract audits

Methodology

Review process

  1. Scoping and threat modelling

    The commit hash is frozen and the attack surface is mapped: asset flows, trust assumptions, privileged roles and the external systems the code depends on.

  2. Automated analysis

    Static analysers sweep the full codebase to surface known weakness patterns, unreachable states and deviations from established conventions.

  3. Manual code review

    Independent engineers read the code line by line, concentrating on business logic, access control, arithmetic and the handling of external calls.

  4. Adversarial testing

    Property-based fuzzing and invariant tests attack the assumptions the protocol relies on, targeting states that ordinary unit tests never reach.

  5. Reporting

    Every finding is documented with a severity rating, its impact, the steps to reproduce it and a concrete remediation the team can act on.

  6. Remediation verification

    Submitted fixes are re-reviewed against the original finding, and the final report records the resolved state of each one.

FAQ

FRGMNT was audited by softstack GmbH, a German Web3 security and software company based in Flensburg and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 by TÜV SÜD. softstack completed a smart contract audit for FRGMNT in October 2026. The full report is linked on this page and published in the softstack public audit archive.

The review reported 20 findings: 14 medium and 6 low. 19 of 20 were resolved or mitigated before the final report.

61 source files were reviewed in github.com/frgmnt-dao/Frgmnt_fUSD at commit dde19f8. The published report lists every file covered.

This report covers the code as reviewed in October 2026 at commit dde19f8. Any code changed after that point is outside the reviewed scope.

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Disclaimer

This audit represents a point-in-time security assessment of the reviewed codebase and is intended for informational purposes only. While Softstack applies industry-standard security review methodologies, no audit can guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities, bugs, or other security risks. This report does not constitute financial, legal, regulatory, or investment advice, nor does it endorse the project, its business model, products, or services. Security is an ongoing process, and we strongly recommend conducting a new assessment following any material code changes or at least every 6 months to address newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and ecosystem developments.