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Web3 · Smart Contract Audit
FRGMNT Security Audit
softstack completed a smart contract audit of FRGMNT's fUSD and fEURO stablecoin protocol in October 2026, reporting 20 findings (14 medium and 6 low), of which 19 were resolved or mitigated before the final report. The full report is published in the softstack public audit archive.
Key facts
- Client
- FRGMNT
- Completed
- Chains
- Base
- Languages
- Solidity, TypeScript
- Commit
dde19f8
About the project
FRGMNT is a multi-collateralised stablecoin protocol deployed on Base. Users deposit supported dollar stablecoins and receive fUSD, a transferable token pegged to the US dollar. fEURO, a euro-pegged stablecoin, runs on the same protocol infrastructure and was reviewed alongside fUSD. Staking fUSD issues sfUSD, which accrues yield from a vault that allocates collateral across on-chain stablecoin strategies. The project has partnered with Anchorage Digital for institutional access to fUSD.
Case study
Scope
Source repositorygithub.com/frgmnt-dao/Frgmnt_fUSDComponents reviewed
14 modules · 61 files- AaveLendingPoolAssetGuard.sol
- AaveV3LendingPoolSelectiveAssetGuard.sol
- AaveV4SpokeSelectiveAssetGuard.sol
- AaveV4TokenizationAssetGuard.sol
- MorphoBlueLendingPoolAssetGuard.sol
- MorphoBlueLendingPoolSelectiveAssetGuard.sol
- MorphoVaultV2AssetGuard.sol
- AaveLendingPoolGuardV3.sol
- AaveV4SpokeContractGuard.sol
- AaveV4TokenizationContractGuard.sol
- MorphoBlueContractGuard.sol
- MorphoBlueManager.sol
- MorphoVaultV2ContractGuard.sol
- IAggregatorV3Interface.sol
Findings
19 of 20 findings resolved before the final report.
| ID | Title | Severity | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
6.2.1 | Fresh-deployment script leaves the deployer as owner of all three Transparent proxy ProxyAdmins PoolLogic, PoolManagerLogic and AssetHandler are Transparent proxies, each with its own ProxyAdmin. | Medium | fixed |
6.2.2 | execTransaction missing nonReentrant: cross- function reentrancy via callback-exempt manager execTransaction is the sole external state-mutating function on PoolLogic that lacks nonReentrant. All 13 other external state-mutating entrypoints carry the modifier. | Medium | fixed |
6.2.3 | executeOperation missing nonReentrant: partial NAV reentrancy during Aave flashloan unwind PoolLogic.executeOperation carries no nonReentrant modifier. The transaction loop inside PoolLogicFlashloanAave executes arbitrary external calls. | Medium | fixed |
6.2.4 | onMorphoFlashLoan missing nonReentrant: partial NAV reentrancy during Morpho flashloan unwind The Morpho Blue flashloan path has the same nonReentrant gap as the Aave path (F-PLFA-001). onMorphoFlashLoan is external override with no nonReentrant modifier. | Medium | fixed |
6.2.6 | Hub-wide liquidity overstatement in AaveV4SpokeAssetGuard: per- Spoke cross-pool capping absent Re-verification note (final review, 12 October): this section consolidates the former Aave V4 Spoke TOCTOU finding (validated as F-AV4-001) with the per-call-frame ledger gap (F-005). | Medium | acknowledged |
6.2.7 | withdrawalSlippageBps dual-use: spot-TWAP deviation gate and LP output slippage share one threshold withdrawalSlippageBps (default 100 bps, max 2000 bps) is used for two independent purposes. First, it gates the TWAP oracle check: if spot deviates from the 10-minute TWAP by more than withdrawalSlippageBps, the withdrawal reverts. | Medium | fixed |
6.2.8 | UniswapV3SelectiveAssetGuard inherits withdrawalSlippageBps dual- use UniswapV3SelectiveAssetGuard inherits _checkSpotPriceDeviation from UniswapV3AssetGuard without overriding it, inheriting the same dual-use parameter conflict described in F-014. Selective withdrawal paths are equally exposed. | Medium | fixed |
6.2.9 | AaveLendingPoolAssetGuard: unconfigured collateral swap route causes permanent pool-wide DoS Re-verification note (final review, 12 October): reclassified from High. The trigger is a trusted-role configuration gap (a manager adds an Aave collateral asset while the owner has not configured its swap route, with any debt… | Medium | fixed |
6.2.10 | UniswapV3RouterGuard does not validate amountOutMinimum on manager swaps All four branches of txGuard (exactInput, exactInputSingle, exactOutput, exactOutputSingle) validate that the destination asset is supported and the recipient is the pool, but impose no check on params.amountOutMinimum (or… | Medium | fixed |
6.2.11 | Contracts that the documents call protocol-owned are owned by the pool manager Safe, so the manager can move the pool's USDC out through a Morpho market it… docs/contracts/MorphoBlueManager.md states that the owner is the protocol owner (intended to be the Timelock) and describes the market allowlist as a second, independent, protocol-owner-only approval step that stops a manager from… | Medium | fixed |
6.2.12 | The Uniswap router guard validates only the first and last token of a multi-hop path, and PoolLogic.execTransaction is unlocked, so a manager or trader can… A manager or trader sends an exactOutput swap whose path runs through a token it controls (USDC, HOP, USDC). The guard checks that the destination is a supported asset and the recipient is the pool, and it never inspects the middle token. | Medium | fixed |
6.2.13 | The manager can act as any user on deposit, stake, unstake and immediate withdrawal by listing a contract as a callback sender Both _actionSender helpers replace msg.sender with IUserActionSender(sender).actionUser() whenever the sender is on the pool's callback allowlist. The intended member is FrgmntUserActions, which sets actionUser to its own caller. | Medium | fixed |
6.2.15 | Reference attester service lets the requesting user choose which assets a plan draws from Section 3.1 of the design document explains why a user must not choose the asset mix of a withdrawal: each rational user takes the healthiest and most liquid assets first and leaves the impaired or illiquid ones to whoever exits later,… | Low | fixed |
6.2.16 | A token-only plan in a pool with a debt-bearing position leaves accountedAssets below the gross NAV, so the next accrual mints a fee and rewards from the… accountedAssets is the high-water mark used to recognize yield. A plan withdrawal lowers it by the value taken out plus the leaving claims' share of the existing overhang (the FNA-42 remediation), computed through… | Low | fixed |
6.2.17 | A dust queued request lets any fUSD holder block plan draws of a deposit asset in queue mode A plan may not draw an asset that has Pending queued withdrawal requests, so a plan cannot starve finalization. | Low | fixed |
6.2.18 | The attested-only upgrade path leaves validated protections inactive and cannot be completed by the core upgrade script Two scripts can upgrade the live PoolLogic. The core script upgrades PoolLogic, TokenLogic, AssetHandler and PoolManagerLogic in one atomic Safe batch of nine calls. | Low | fixed |
6.2.19 | A floored NAV hides a direct-leg over-draw when the deficit comes from another guard completeFundValue is the sum of the guard balances minus the sum of the guard deficits, floored at zero. The plan's two NAV bounds are measured on it before and after the allocation loop. | Low | fixed |
6.2.20 | The emergency stop is not independent of the manager, or arrives after a rotation matures, in configurations the repository's own scripts produce The factoryOwner's latched stop is the only control of the attested-withdrawal feature that does not depend on the manager (design document section 3.9). | Low | fixed |
6.2.5 | Fee unit-of-account mismatch in FundCalculationLibrary fee summation calculateManagementFee at line 61 computes the fee as a fraction of the raw fUSD token supply: managementFee = (_totalFusd * _managementFeeNumerator * dt) / _feeDenominator / 365 days calculatePerformanceFee at line 36 returns a value… | Medium | fixed |
6.2.14 | Liquidity provision through the Uniswap guard has no loss accounting beyond a price band of about 1 percent, so a trader can sandwich the pool's own mints… The guard lets the manager or the trader mint a position or add liquidity for the pool when the pool's spot price is inside a band around the Chainlink fair price. | Medium | fixed |
About this engagement
A smart contract audit reviews on-chain code for flaws an attacker could exploit. Engineers trace how assets move through the contracts, check who can call privileged functions, and test the arithmetic, external calls and upgrade paths. Each finding is rated by severity, and fixes are re-checked before the final report.
How softstack runs smart contract auditsMethodology
Review process
Scoping and threat modelling
The commit hash is frozen and the attack surface is mapped: asset flows, trust assumptions, privileged roles and the external systems the code depends on.
Automated analysis
Static analysers sweep the full codebase to surface known weakness patterns, unreachable states and deviations from established conventions.
Manual code review
Independent engineers read the code line by line, concentrating on business logic, access control, arithmetic and the handling of external calls.
Adversarial testing
Property-based fuzzing and invariant tests attack the assumptions the protocol relies on, targeting states that ordinary unit tests never reach.
Reporting
Every finding is documented with a severity rating, its impact, the steps to reproduce it and a concrete remediation the team can act on.
Remediation verification
Submitted fixes are re-reviewed against the original finding, and the final report records the resolved state of each one.
FAQ
FRGMNT was audited by softstack GmbH, a German Web3 security and software company based in Flensburg and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 by TÜV SÜD. softstack completed a smart contract audit for FRGMNT in October 2026. The full report is linked on this page and published in the softstack public audit archive.
The review reported 20 findings: 14 medium and 6 low. 19 of 20 were resolved or mitigated before the final report.
61 source files were reviewed in github.com/frgmnt-dao/Frgmnt_fUSD at commit dde19f8. The published report lists every file covered.
This report covers the code as reviewed in October 2026 at commit dde19f8. Any code changed after that point is outside the reviewed scope.
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Browse all security auditsDisclaimer
This audit represents a point-in-time security assessment of the reviewed codebase and is intended for informational purposes only. While Softstack applies industry-standard security review methodologies, no audit can guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities, bugs, or other security risks. This report does not constitute financial, legal, regulatory, or investment advice, nor does it endorse the project, its business model, products, or services. Security is an ongoing process, and we strongly recommend conducting a new assessment following any material code changes or at least every 6 months to address newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and ecosystem developments.