Web3 · Smart Contract Audit
GAIA Security Audits
softstack has completed 2 smart contract audits for GAIA between December 2021 and April 2022, reporting 28 findings in total (3 high, 5 medium, 12 low and 8 informational), of which 25 were resolved or mitigated before the final reports. Every report is published in the softstack public audit archive.
Key facts
- Client
- GAIA
- Audits completed
- 2
- First audited
- Latest audit
- Chains
- Ethereum
- Languages
- Solidity, JavaScript
- Market cap
- $33,409 as of 2026-09-30
About the project
Gaia Everworld is a multi-region fantasy game in which players build kingdoms, explore lands, and collect, breed and battle characters called Gaia Legionnaires. In-game items and characters are issued as NFTs that players own and trade. The project combines traditional fantasy settings with blockchain-based asset ownership on Ethereum-compatible networks.
Findings
Combined across all 2 reviews softstack has completed for GAIA. Each report is broken out below.
25 of 28 findings resolved before the final reports.
Reports
Newest first. Every report covers its own scope and commit.
WORLD EverLand smart contract audit
0Critical2High5Medium12Low7Informational25 of 26 resolved
Scope
Source repositorygithub.com/GaiaEverworld/GAIAWhitelistComponents reviewed
4 modules · 4 files- GAIALand.sol
- EverLand.sol
- truffle-config.js
- hardhat.config.js
All 26 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1The Owner Can Increase The Fee To 1000 When a user buys a token using an auction, a portion of the price is taken by the contract as a commission. The commission percentage m_MarketingCommission is modifiable by the owner and can be updated to any value.
High fixed 6.2.2Centralization Risks The owner can burn any tokens using the burn function, and thus any user can lose the NFT at any time, this represents a centralization risk.
High fixed 6.2.3Type Conversion Can Result Fee Bypassing When a user buys an NFT using an auction, a portion of the price is taken by the contract as a commission.
Medium fixed 6.2.4Overpowered Owner Rights Owners can perform privileged activities like withdraw funds from contract, reserve GAIALANDS to any address(can effectively burn by sending to zero address), pause contracts by making sale inactive, set the price, set maximum reserve and…
Medium fixed 6.2.5Missing Transfer Verification The ERC20 standard token implementation functions return the transaction status as a Boolean. It is good practice to check for the return status of the function call, to ensure that the transaction was successful.
Medium fixed 6.2.6Ether Or Tokens Can Get Locked The user can buy an specific NFT by calling the buy function and paying the price specified in the auction.
Medium fixed 6.2.7Race Condition The user can mint NFTs using the PGAIAA token, depending on multiple parameters, some of them are m_EpicPrice or m_RegularPrice. These two variables can be changed by the owner.
Medium fixed 6.2.8Missing Value Verification Certain functions lack a safety check in the values, the values of the arguments should be verified to allow only the ones that go with the contract’s logic.
Low fixed 6.2.9Missing Zero Address Checks In the current implementation, there is an address set without checking for the zero address. This can lead to unintended behaviour.
Low fixed 6.2.10Renounce Ownership Typically, the contract's owner is the account that deploys the contract. As a result, the owner can perform certain privileged activities. The renounceOwnership function is used in smart contracts to renounce ownership.
Low fixed 6.2.11Variable Could Be Declared Constant Variables could be declared constant
Low fixed 6.2.12Public Functions Should Be Declared As External In the current implementation several functions are declared as public where they could be external. For public functions Solidity immediately copies array arguments to memory, while external functions can read directly from calldata.
Low fixed 6.2.13State Visibility Is Not Set State variables without visibility set.
Low fixed 6.2.14Redundant Code The current implementation has a redundant code in function buy() and buyToken()
Low fixed 6.2.15Missing Zero Address Checks In the current implementation several functions are not checking for zero addresses. Setting an address to the zero address can result in loosing funds by sending it to the zero address.
Low fixed 6.2.16Missing Events Several functions will benefit from having events, which are allowing a proper tracking, logging in some cases.
Low fixed 6.2.17Long Number Literals Long number literals hardcoded in the contracts are prone to errors.
Low fixed 6.2.18No Return Value Checks Contract may fail or work unexpectedly if return values are not checked.
Low fixed 6.2.19Inefficient Use Of Structs Structs not properly used in terms of variable sizes, and ordering may result in higher gas costs.
Low fixed 6.2.20Missing Natspec Documentation Solidity contracts can use a special form of comments to provide rich documentation for function, return variables, and more. This special form is named Ethereum Natural Language Specification Format(NatSpec).
Informational acknowledged 6.2.21Floating Pragma Version Identified It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely
Informational fixed 6.2.22Floating Compiler Versions The current pragma solidity directive is floating. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds.
Informational fixed 6.2.23Using Newest Compiler Version A higher compiler version has in most cases new features implemented or bugs fixed.
Informational fixed 6.2.24Unnecessary Initializations When a variable is declared in solidity, it gets initialized with its type’s default value.
Informational fixed 6.2.25Unnecessary Argument In selectedMint() Consider using directly the length of the array ‘ids‘ and removing the _countOfLands argument.
Informational fixed 6.2.26Isolate The Merkle Root Verification It is recommended to isolate the verification of the Merkle root and the business logic function into a separate modifier for clean architecture.
Informational fixed WORLD LP Wrapper smart contract audit
0Critical1High0Medium0Low1Informational0 of 2 resolved
Scope
Components reviewed
1 module · 1 file- LPWrapper.sol
All 2 findings
ID Title Severity Status 5.1.1Selfdestruct owner Code Snippet Result/Recommendation Use of selfdestruct: Can block calling contracts unexpectedly. Be especially careful if this contract is planned to be used by other contracts (i.e. library contracts, interactions).
High acknowledged 5.1.2Floating compiler versions Code Snippet Result/Recommendation The current pragma solidity directive is floating. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that
Informational acknowledged
About this engagement
A smart contract audit reviews on-chain code for flaws an attacker could exploit. Engineers trace how assets move through the contracts, check who can call privileged functions, and test the arithmetic, external calls and upgrade paths. Each finding is rated by severity, and fixes are re-checked before the final report.
How softstack runs smart contract auditsMethodology
Review process
Scoping and threat modelling
The commit hash is frozen and the attack surface is mapped: asset flows, trust assumptions, privileged roles and the external systems the code depends on.
Automated analysis
Static analysers sweep the full codebase to surface known weakness patterns, unreachable states and deviations from established conventions.
Manual code review
Independent engineers read the code line by line, concentrating on business logic, access control, arithmetic and the handling of external calls.
Adversarial testing
Property-based fuzzing and invariant tests attack the assumptions the protocol relies on, targeting states that ordinary unit tests never reach.
Reporting
Every finding is documented with a severity rating, its impact, the steps to reproduce it and a concrete remediation the team can act on.
Remediation verification
Submitted fixes are re-reviewed against the original finding, and the final report records the resolved state of each one.
Standards and references
- SWC RegistrySmart Contract Weakness Classification
- CWECommon Weakness Enumeration
FAQ
GAIA was audited by softstack GmbH, a German Web3 security and software company based in Flensburg and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 by TÜV SÜD. softstack has completed 2 smart contract audits for GAIA between December 2021 and April 2022. The published reports are linked on this page and in the softstack public audit archive.
2 separate reviews, the first in December 2021 and the most recent in April 2022. Each one covers its own scope and commit, and is listed individually on this page.
28 findings across all 2 reviews: 3 high, 5 medium, 12 low and 8 informational. 25 of 28 were resolved or mitigated before the final reports.
Each report covers the code as it stood at the commit it names, the most recent in April 2022. Any code changed after that point is outside the reviewed scope.
Related audits
Browse all security auditsDisclaimer
This audit represents a point-in-time security assessment of the reviewed codebase and is intended for informational purposes only. While Softstack applies industry-standard security review methodologies, no audit can guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities, bugs, or other security risks. This report does not constitute financial, legal, regulatory, or investment advice, nor does it endorse the project, its business model, products, or services. Security is an ongoing process, and we strongly recommend conducting a new assessment following any material code changes or at least every 6 months to address newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and ecosystem developments.