Web3 · Smart Contract Audit

GAIA Security Audits

softstack has completed 2 smart contract audits for GAIA between December 2021 and April 2022, reporting 28 findings in total (3 high, 5 medium, 12 low and 8 informational), of which 25 were resolved or mitigated before the final reports. Every report is published in the softstack public audit archive.

Key facts

Client
GAIA
Audits completed
2
First audited
Latest audit
Chains
Ethereum
Languages
Solidity, JavaScript
Market cap
$33,409 as of 2026-09-30

About the project

Gaia Everworld is a multi-region fantasy game in which players build kingdoms, explore lands, and collect, breed and battle characters called Gaia Legionnaires. In-game items and characters are issued as NFTs that players own and trade. The project combines traditional fantasy settings with blockchain-based asset ownership on Ethereum-compatible networks.

Findings

Combined across all 2 reviews softstack has completed for GAIA. Each report is broken out below.

0Critical
3High
5Medium
12Low
8Informational

25 of 28 findings resolved before the final reports.

Reports

Newest first. Every report covers its own scope and commit.

  1. WORLD EverLand smart contract audit

    · commit e458d22 · 4 files

    PDF
    0Critical
    2High
    5Medium
    12Low
    7Informational

    25 of 26 resolved

    ScopeSource repositorygithub.com/GaiaEverworld/GAIAWhitelist

    Components reviewed

    4 modules · 4 files
    1. GAIALand.sol
    2. EverLand.sol
    3. truffle-config.js
    4. hardhat.config.js
    All 26 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    6.2.1The Owner Can Increase The Fee To 1000

    When a user buys a token using an auction, a portion of the price is taken by the contract as a commission. The commission percentage m_MarketingCommission is modifiable by the owner and can be updated to any value.

    Highfixed
    6.2.2Centralization Risks

    The owner can burn any tokens using the burn function, and thus any user can lose the NFT at any time, this represents a centralization risk.

    Highfixed
    6.2.3Type Conversion Can Result Fee Bypassing

    When a user buys an NFT using an auction, a portion of the price is taken by the contract as a commission.

    Mediumfixed
    6.2.4Overpowered Owner Rights

    Owners can perform privileged activities like withdraw funds from contract, reserve GAIALANDS to any address(can effectively burn by sending to zero address), pause contracts by making sale inactive, set the price, set maximum reserve and…

    Mediumfixed
    6.2.5Missing Transfer Verification

    The ERC20 standard token implementation functions return the transaction status as a Boolean. It is good practice to check for the return status of the function call, to ensure that the transaction was successful.

    Mediumfixed
    6.2.6Ether Or Tokens Can Get Locked

    The user can buy an specific NFT by calling the buy function and paying the price specified in the auction.

    Mediumfixed
    6.2.7Race Condition

    The user can mint NFTs using the PGAIAA token, depending on multiple parameters, some of them are m_EpicPrice or m_RegularPrice. These two variables can be changed by the owner.

    Mediumfixed
    6.2.8Missing Value Verification

    Certain functions lack a safety check in the values, the values of the arguments should be verified to allow only the ones that go with the contract’s logic.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.9Missing Zero Address Checks

    In the current implementation, there is an address set without checking for the zero address. This can lead to unintended behaviour.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.10Renounce Ownership

    Typically, the contract's owner is the account that deploys the contract. As a result, the owner can perform certain privileged activities. The renounceOwnership function is used in smart contracts to renounce ownership.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.11Variable Could Be Declared Constant

    Variables could be declared constant

    Lowfixed
    6.2.12Public Functions Should Be Declared As External

    In the current implementation several functions are declared as public where they could be external. For public functions Solidity immediately copies array arguments to memory, while external functions can read directly from calldata.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.13State Visibility Is Not Set

    State variables without visibility set.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.14Redundant Code

    The current implementation has a redundant code in function buy() and buyToken()

    Lowfixed
    6.2.15Missing Zero Address Checks

    In the current implementation several functions are not checking for zero addresses. Setting an address to the zero address can result in loosing funds by sending it to the zero address.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.16Missing Events

    Several functions will benefit from having events, which are allowing a proper tracking, logging in some cases.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.17Long Number Literals

    Long number literals hardcoded in the contracts are prone to errors.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.18No Return Value Checks

    Contract may fail or work unexpectedly if return values are not checked.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.19Inefficient Use Of Structs

    Structs not properly used in terms of variable sizes, and ordering may result in higher gas costs.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.20Missing Natspec Documentation

    Solidity contracts can use a special form of comments to provide rich documentation for function, return variables, and more. This special form is named Ethereum Natural Language Specification Format(NatSpec).

    Informationalacknowledged
    6.2.21Floating Pragma Version Identified

    It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely

    Informationalfixed
    6.2.22Floating Compiler Versions

    The current pragma solidity directive is floating. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds.

    Informationalfixed
    6.2.23Using Newest Compiler Version

    A higher compiler version has in most cases new features implemented or bugs fixed.

    Informationalfixed
    6.2.24Unnecessary Initializations

    When a variable is declared in solidity, it gets initialized with its type’s default value.

    Informationalfixed
    6.2.25Unnecessary Argument In selectedMint()

    Consider using directly the length of the array ‘ids‘ and removing the _countOfLands argument.

    Informationalfixed
    6.2.26Isolate The Merkle Root Verification

    It is recommended to isolate the verification of the Merkle root and the business logic function into a separate modifier for clean architecture.

    Informationalfixed
  2. WORLD LP Wrapper smart contract audit

    · 1 file

    PDF
    0Critical
    1High
    0Medium
    0Low
    1Informational

    0 of 2 resolved

    Scope

    Components reviewed

    1 module · 1 file
    1. LPWrapper.sol
    All 2 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    5.1.1Selfdestruct owner

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation Use of selfdestruct: Can block calling contracts unexpectedly. Be especially careful if this contract is planned to be used by other contracts (i.e. library contracts, interactions).

    Highacknowledged
    5.1.2Floating compiler versions

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation The current pragma solidity directive is floating. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that

    Informationalacknowledged

About this engagement

A smart contract audit reviews on-chain code for flaws an attacker could exploit. Engineers trace how assets move through the contracts, check who can call privileged functions, and test the arithmetic, external calls and upgrade paths. Each finding is rated by severity, and fixes are re-checked before the final report.

How softstack runs smart contract audits

Methodology

Review process

  1. Scoping and threat modelling

    The commit hash is frozen and the attack surface is mapped: asset flows, trust assumptions, privileged roles and the external systems the code depends on.

  2. Automated analysis

    Static analysers sweep the full codebase to surface known weakness patterns, unreachable states and deviations from established conventions.

  3. Manual code review

    Independent engineers read the code line by line, concentrating on business logic, access control, arithmetic and the handling of external calls.

  4. Adversarial testing

    Property-based fuzzing and invariant tests attack the assumptions the protocol relies on, targeting states that ordinary unit tests never reach.

  5. Reporting

    Every finding is documented with a severity rating, its impact, the steps to reproduce it and a concrete remediation the team can act on.

  6. Remediation verification

    Submitted fixes are re-reviewed against the original finding, and the final report records the resolved state of each one.

Standards and references

  • SWC RegistrySmart Contract Weakness Classification
  • CWECommon Weakness Enumeration

FAQ

GAIA was audited by softstack GmbH, a German Web3 security and software company based in Flensburg and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 by TÜV SÜD. softstack has completed 2 smart contract audits for GAIA between December 2021 and April 2022. The published reports are linked on this page and in the softstack public audit archive.

2 separate reviews, the first in December 2021 and the most recent in April 2022. Each one covers its own scope and commit, and is listed individually on this page.

28 findings across all 2 reviews: 3 high, 5 medium, 12 low and 8 informational. 25 of 28 were resolved or mitigated before the final reports.

Each report covers the code as it stood at the commit it names, the most recent in April 2022. Any code changed after that point is outside the reviewed scope.

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Disclaimer

This audit represents a point-in-time security assessment of the reviewed codebase and is intended for informational purposes only. While Softstack applies industry-standard security review methodologies, no audit can guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities, bugs, or other security risks. This report does not constitute financial, legal, regulatory, or investment advice, nor does it endorse the project, its business model, products, or services. Security is an ongoing process, and we strongly recommend conducting a new assessment following any material code changes or at least every 6 months to address newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and ecosystem developments.