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Web3 · Smart Contract Audit
Swell Network Security Audits
softstack has completed 3 smart contract audits for Swell Network between March 2022 and October 2022, reporting 19 findings in total (1 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 10 low and 5 informational), of which 12 were resolved or mitigated before the final reports. Every report is published in the softstack public audit archive.
Key facts
- Client
- Swell Network
- Audits completed
- 3
- First audited
- Latest audit
- Chains
- Ethereum
- Languages
- Solidity
- Market cap
- $4M as of 2026-09-30
About the project
Swell Network is a non-custodial Ethereum liquid staking and restaking protocol organised as a DAO. Depositors stake ether to receive swETH, a liquid staking token, or restake through rswETH to earn rewards from EigenLayer and other restaking layers. Both tokens can be used across DeFi protocols, while the SWELL token handles governance.
Findings
Combined across all 3 reviews softstack has completed for Swell Network. Each report is broken out below.
12 of 19 findings resolved before the final reports.
Reports
Newest first. Every report covers its own scope and commit.
Aura Vault smart contract audit
0Critical0High0Medium0Low1Informational0 of 1 resolved
Scope
Source repositorygithub.com/SwellNetwork/vaultComponents reviewed
1 module · 1 file- SwellAuraVault.sol
All 1 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Missing Natspec Documentation Solidity contracts can use a special form of comments to provide rich documentation for function, return variables, and more. This special form is named Ethereum Natural Language Specification Format(NatSpec).
Informational acknowledged Vault smart contract audit
0Critical0High1Medium4Low3Informational5 of 8 resolved
Scope
Source repositorygithub.com/SwellNetwork/vaultComponents reviewed
2 modules · 2 files- SwellBalancerVault.sol
- ERC4626.sol
All 8 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Rounding Errors Can Lead To Ignore Slippage In the beforeWithdraw hook, the amountsOut[i] is calculated by removing a 1% of slippage. If assets are less than 100 the results of amountsOut[i] will be equal to, assets thus ignoring the slippage.
Medium acknowledged 6.2.2Racing Condition in Approve Function The ERC4626 contract implements the standard ERC20, which contains a widely known racing condition in the approve function. A known race condition exists within the present implementation of the ERC20 standard.
Low fixed 6.2.3Missing Zero Address Checks In the current implementation, there is an address set without checking for the zero address. This can lead to unintended behaviour.
Low fixed 6.2.4For Loop Over Dynamic Array When smart contracts are deployed or their associated functions are invoked, the execution of these operations always consumes a certain quantity of gas, according to the amount of computation required to accomplish them.
Low acknowledged 6.2.5Missing Value Verification Certain functions lack a safety check in the values, the values of the arguments should be verified to allow only the ones that go with the contract’s logic.
Low fixed 6.2.6Floating And Multiple Pragma Version Identified It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely
Informational fixed 6.2.7Unnecessary Call To The Balancer Vault For The Pool Address For getting the pool address, it will less costly in term of gas if it’s calculated automatically instead of performing a call to the Balancer Vault. The address is calculated using the following code
Informational fixed 6.2.8Missing Natspec Documentation Solidity contracts can use a special form of comments to provide rich documentation for function, return variables, and more. This special form is named Ethereum Natural Language Specification Format(NatSpec).
Informational acknowledged Staking Protocol smart contract audit
1Critical1High1Medium6Low1Informational7 of 10 resolved
Scope
Components reviewed
14 modules · 23 files- contracts/helpers.sol
- contracts/swETH.sol
- contracts/Strategy.sol
- contracts/swNFTUpgrade.sol
- contracts/swDAO.sol
- contracts/interfaces/ISWETH.sol
- contracts/interfaces/ISWNFT.sol
- contracts/interfaces/IStrategy.sol
- contracts/libraries/NFTDescriptor.sol
- contracts/libraries/NFTSVG.sol
- contracts/libraries/HexStrings.sol
- swDAO.sol
- swNFTUpgrade.sol
- _eth1WithdrawalAddressswNFTUpgrade.sol
All 10 findings
ID Title Severity Status 5.1.1Initialize not protected Code Snippet Result/Recommendation SWNFTUpgrade is an upgradeable contract that uses an initializer. The initialize function is an unprotected external function.
Critical acknowledged 5.1.2Possible reentrancy attack vector Code Snippet Result/Recommendation Reentrancy due to _safeMint() usage in staking function. If receiver is a contract which needs to implement onERC721Received can call back into the staking function.
High fixed 5.1.3Missing require check Code Snippet Result/Recommendation Missing require statement can decrease the quote of failures. swNFTUpgrade.sol (line 95-102) function removeStrategy(uint strategy) onlyOwner external{ require(strategies[strategy] != address(0),…
Medium fixed 5.1.4Error strings in require Code Snippet Result/Recommendation Require statements without error strings Strategy.sol (line 20) modifier onlyswNFT { require(msg.sender == swNFT); _; } It is recommended that all require statements have an error message.
Low acknowledged 5.1.5Variables that can be made constant or immutable Code Snippet Result/Recommendation State variables that do not change during life of contract or are set at construction and never change can be made constant or immutable swETH.sol(line 11) address public minter; Strategy.sol (line 14)…
Low fixed 5.1.6Missing zero-address checks Code Snippet Result/Recommendation In the current implementation, there are several addresses set without checking for the zero address. This can lead to unintended behaviour.
Low fixed 5.1.7Hardcoded address Code Snippet Result/Recommendation Hardcoded values like addresses can impact the life time of the contract, as they may change in the future.
Low acknowledged 5.1.8Events without indexed parameters Code Snippet Result/Recommendation State variables that do not change during life of contract or are set at construction and never change can be made constant or immutable All events It is recommended to index parameters, especially those…
Low fixed 5.1.9Ownership control Code Snippet Result/Recommendation SWNFTUpgrade contract is Ownable. While it allows setting of restricted aspects and only owner functions like upgrade. It centralizes power in one address.
Low fixed 5.1.10Uncomplete repository clean-up Code Snippet Result/Recommendation File swDAO.sol appears not to be used in the current implementation.
Informational fixed
About this engagement
A smart contract audit reviews on-chain code for flaws an attacker could exploit. Engineers trace how assets move through the contracts, check who can call privileged functions, and test the arithmetic, external calls and upgrade paths. Each finding is rated by severity, and fixes are re-checked before the final report.
How softstack runs smart contract auditsMethodology
Review process
Scoping and threat modelling
The commit hash is frozen and the attack surface is mapped: asset flows, trust assumptions, privileged roles and the external systems the code depends on.
Automated analysis
Static analysers sweep the full codebase to surface known weakness patterns, unreachable states and deviations from established conventions.
Manual code review
Independent engineers read the code line by line, concentrating on business logic, access control, arithmetic and the handling of external calls.
Adversarial testing
Property-based fuzzing and invariant tests attack the assumptions the protocol relies on, targeting states that ordinary unit tests never reach.
Reporting
Every finding is documented with a severity rating, its impact, the steps to reproduce it and a concrete remediation the team can act on.
Remediation verification
Submitted fixes are re-reviewed against the original finding, and the final report records the resolved state of each one.
Standards and references
- SWC RegistrySmart Contract Weakness Classification
- CWECommon Weakness Enumeration
FAQ
Swell Network was audited by softstack GmbH, a German Web3 security and software company based in Flensburg and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 by TÜV SÜD. softstack has completed 3 smart contract audits for Swell Network between March 2022 and October 2022. The published reports are linked on this page and in the softstack public audit archive.
3 separate reviews, the first in March 2022 and the most recent in October 2022. Each one covers its own scope and commit, and is listed individually on this page.
19 findings across all 3 reviews: 1 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 10 low and 5 informational. 12 of 19 were resolved or mitigated before the final reports.
Each report covers the code as it stood at the commit it names, the most recent in October 2022. Any code changed after that point is outside the reviewed scope.
Related audits
Browse all security auditsDisclaimer
This audit represents a point-in-time security assessment of the reviewed codebase and is intended for informational purposes only. While Softstack applies industry-standard security review methodologies, no audit can guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities, bugs, or other security risks. This report does not constitute financial, legal, regulatory, or investment advice, nor does it endorse the project, its business model, products, or services. Security is an ongoing process, and we strongly recommend conducting a new assessment following any material code changes or at least every 6 months to address newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and ecosystem developments.