Web3 · Smart Contract Audit

Swell Network Security Audits

softstack has completed 3 smart contract audits for Swell Network between March 2022 and October 2022, reporting 19 findings in total (1 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 10 low and 5 informational), of which 12 were resolved or mitigated before the final reports. Every report is published in the softstack public audit archive.

Key facts

Client
Swell Network
Audits completed
3
First audited
Latest audit
Chains
Ethereum
Languages
Solidity
Market cap
$4M as of 2026-09-30

About the project

Swell Network is a non-custodial Ethereum liquid staking and restaking protocol organised as a DAO. Depositors stake ether to receive swETH, a liquid staking token, or restake through rswETH to earn rewards from EigenLayer and other restaking layers. Both tokens can be used across DeFi protocols, while the SWELL token handles governance.

Findings

Combined across all 3 reviews softstack has completed for Swell Network. Each report is broken out below.

1Critical
1High
2Medium
10Low
5Informational

12 of 19 findings resolved before the final reports.

Reports

Newest first. Every report covers its own scope and commit.

  1. Aura Vault smart contract audit

    · commit 2470916 · 1 file

    PDF
    0Critical
    0High
    0Medium
    0Low
    1Informational

    0 of 1 resolved

    ScopeSource repositorygithub.com/SwellNetwork/vault

    Components reviewed

    1 module · 1 file
    1. SwellAuraVault.sol
    All 1 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    6.2.1Missing Natspec Documentation

    Solidity contracts can use a special form of comments to provide rich documentation for function, return variables, and more. This special form is named Ethereum Natural Language Specification Format(NatSpec).

    Informationalacknowledged
  2. Vault smart contract audit

    · commit 566e0c8 · 2 files

    PDF
    0Critical
    0High
    1Medium
    4Low
    3Informational

    5 of 8 resolved

    ScopeSource repositorygithub.com/SwellNetwork/vault

    Components reviewed

    2 modules · 2 files
    1. SwellBalancerVault.sol
    2. ERC4626.sol
    All 8 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    6.2.1Rounding Errors Can Lead To Ignore Slippage

    In the beforeWithdraw hook, the amountsOut[i] is calculated by removing a 1% of slippage. If assets are less than 100 the results of amountsOut[i] will be equal to, assets thus ignoring the slippage.

    Mediumacknowledged
    6.2.2Racing Condition in Approve Function

    The ERC4626 contract implements the standard ERC20, which contains a widely known racing condition in the approve function. A known race condition exists within the present implementation of the ERC20 standard.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.3Missing Zero Address Checks

    In the current implementation, there is an address set without checking for the zero address. This can lead to unintended behaviour.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.4For Loop Over Dynamic Array

    When smart contracts are deployed or their associated functions are invoked, the execution of these operations always consumes a certain quantity of gas, according to the amount of computation required to accomplish them.

    Lowacknowledged
    6.2.5Missing Value Verification

    Certain functions lack a safety check in the values, the values of the arguments should be verified to allow only the ones that go with the contract’s logic.

    Lowfixed
    6.2.6Floating And Multiple Pragma Version Identified

    It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely

    Informationalfixed
    6.2.7Unnecessary Call To The Balancer Vault For The Pool Address

    For getting the pool address, it will less costly in term of gas if it’s calculated automatically instead of performing a call to the Balancer Vault. The address is calculated using the following code

    Informationalfixed
    6.2.8Missing Natspec Documentation

    Solidity contracts can use a special form of comments to provide rich documentation for function, return variables, and more. This special form is named Ethereum Natural Language Specification Format(NatSpec).

    Informationalacknowledged
  3. Staking Protocol smart contract audit

    · commit 041aaa4 · 23 files

    PDF
    1Critical
    1High
    1Medium
    6Low
    1Informational

    7 of 10 resolved

    Scope

    Components reviewed

    14 modules · 23 files
    1. contracts/helpers.sol
    2. contracts/swETH.sol
    3. contracts/Strategy.sol
    4. contracts/swNFTUpgrade.sol
    5. contracts/swDAO.sol
    6. contracts/interfaces/ISWETH.sol
    7. contracts/interfaces/ISWNFT.sol
    8. contracts/interfaces/IStrategy.sol
    9. contracts/libraries/NFTDescriptor.sol
    10. contracts/libraries/NFTSVG.sol
    11. contracts/libraries/HexStrings.sol
    12. swDAO.sol
    13. swNFTUpgrade.sol
    14. _eth1WithdrawalAddressswNFTUpgrade.sol
    All 10 findings
    IDTitleSeverityStatus
    5.1.1Initialize not protected

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation SWNFTUpgrade is an upgradeable contract that uses an initializer. The initialize function is an unprotected external function.

    Criticalacknowledged
    5.1.2Possible reentrancy attack vector

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation Reentrancy due to _safeMint() usage in staking function. If receiver is a contract which needs to implement onERC721Received can call back into the staking function.

    Highfixed
    5.1.3Missing require check

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation Missing require statement can decrease the quote of failures. swNFTUpgrade.sol (line 95-102) function removeStrategy(uint strategy) onlyOwner external{ require(strategies[strategy] != address(0),…

    Mediumfixed
    5.1.4Error strings in require

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation Require statements without error strings Strategy.sol (line 20) modifier onlyswNFT { require(msg.sender == swNFT); _; } It is recommended that all require statements have an error message.

    Lowacknowledged
    5.1.5Variables that can be made constant or immutable

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation State variables that do not change during life of contract or are set at construction and never change can be made constant or immutable swETH.sol(line 11) address public minter; Strategy.sol (line 14)…

    Lowfixed
    5.1.6Missing zero-address checks

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation In the current implementation, there are several addresses set without checking for the zero address. This can lead to unintended behaviour.

    Lowfixed
    5.1.7Hardcoded address

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation Hardcoded values like addresses can impact the life time of the contract, as they may change in the future.

    Lowacknowledged
    5.1.8Events without indexed parameters

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation State variables that do not change during life of contract or are set at construction and never change can be made constant or immutable All events It is recommended to index parameters, especially those…

    Lowfixed
    5.1.9Ownership control

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation SWNFTUpgrade contract is Ownable. While it allows setting of restricted aspects and only owner functions like upgrade. It centralizes power in one address.

    Lowfixed
    5.1.10Uncomplete repository clean-up

    Code Snippet Result/Recommendation File swDAO.sol appears not to be used in the current implementation.

    Informationalfixed

About this engagement

A smart contract audit reviews on-chain code for flaws an attacker could exploit. Engineers trace how assets move through the contracts, check who can call privileged functions, and test the arithmetic, external calls and upgrade paths. Each finding is rated by severity, and fixes are re-checked before the final report.

How softstack runs smart contract audits

Methodology

Review process

  1. Scoping and threat modelling

    The commit hash is frozen and the attack surface is mapped: asset flows, trust assumptions, privileged roles and the external systems the code depends on.

  2. Automated analysis

    Static analysers sweep the full codebase to surface known weakness patterns, unreachable states and deviations from established conventions.

  3. Manual code review

    Independent engineers read the code line by line, concentrating on business logic, access control, arithmetic and the handling of external calls.

  4. Adversarial testing

    Property-based fuzzing and invariant tests attack the assumptions the protocol relies on, targeting states that ordinary unit tests never reach.

  5. Reporting

    Every finding is documented with a severity rating, its impact, the steps to reproduce it and a concrete remediation the team can act on.

  6. Remediation verification

    Submitted fixes are re-reviewed against the original finding, and the final report records the resolved state of each one.

Standards and references

  • SWC RegistrySmart Contract Weakness Classification
  • CWECommon Weakness Enumeration

FAQ

Swell Network was audited by softstack GmbH, a German Web3 security and software company based in Flensburg and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 by TÜV SÜD. softstack has completed 3 smart contract audits for Swell Network between March 2022 and October 2022. The published reports are linked on this page and in the softstack public audit archive.

3 separate reviews, the first in March 2022 and the most recent in October 2022. Each one covers its own scope and commit, and is listed individually on this page.

19 findings across all 3 reviews: 1 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 10 low and 5 informational. 12 of 19 were resolved or mitigated before the final reports.

Each report covers the code as it stood at the commit it names, the most recent in October 2022. Any code changed after that point is outside the reviewed scope.

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Disclaimer

This audit represents a point-in-time security assessment of the reviewed codebase and is intended for informational purposes only. While Softstack applies industry-standard security review methodologies, no audit can guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities, bugs, or other security risks. This report does not constitute financial, legal, regulatory, or investment advice, nor does it endorse the project, its business model, products, or services. Security is an ongoing process, and we strongly recommend conducting a new assessment following any material code changes or at least every 6 months to address newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and ecosystem developments.