Web3 · Smart Contract Audit
Fija Security Audits
softstack has completed 2 smart contract audits for Fija between July 2024 and January 2025, reporting 35 findings in total (13 medium, 12 low and 10 informational), of which 23 were resolved or mitigated before the final reports. Every report is published in the softstack public audit archive.
Key facts
- Client
- Fija
- Audits completed
- 2
- First audited
- Latest audit
- Chains
- Ethereum
- Languages
- Solidity
About the project
Fija is a DeFi platform that packages automated yield strategies into products entered with a single deposit. Its strategies are built on protocols such as Aave, Curve and Convex, and each one carries a Safety Score rating blockchain, asset and protocol risk. Fija states that it is EU-licensed and MiCAR compliant, and its positions settle on-chain.
Case study
Findings
Combined across all 2 reviews softstack has completed for Fija. Each report is broken out below.
23 of 35 findings resolved before the final reports.
Reports
Newest first. Every report covers its own scope and commit.
Finance Aave Optimiser smart contract audit
0Critical0High3Medium2Low0Informational3 of 5 resolved
Scope
Source repositorygithub.com/aave/aave-v3-coreComponents reviewed
1 module- See the published report for the file list
All 5 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Emergency Mode Restriction Not Applied to Critical Functions The current implementation of the emergency mode restriction is incomplete. While the emergencyModeRestriction modifier is correctly applied to the deposit function, it is not applied to other critical functions such as withdraw and…
Medium acknowledged 6.2.2Incomplete Fund Allocation in _recalculateAllocations Function The _recalculateAllocations function in the AaveOptimizerStrategy contract has a potential issue with incomplete allocation of funds.
Medium fixed 6.2.3Excessive Swap Deadline Exposes Transactions to Sandwich Attacks The _deposit and _withdraw functions in the AaveOptimizerStrategy contract use a fixed deadline of block.timestamp + 120 (2 minutes) for Uniswap swaps.
Medium fixed 6.2.4Unused Payable Functions Leading to Potential Ether Lock The contract FijaStrategyBase contains three functions (rebalance(), harvest(), and setEmergencyMode()) that are marked as payable but do not utilize the Ether sent to them.
Low acknowledged 6.2.5Insufficient Input Validation in AaveOptimizerStrategy Constructor The constructor of the AaveOptimizerStrategy contract lacks proper input validation for critical parameters, particularly the SLIPPAGE_BPS value.
Low fixed Finance Protocol smart contract audit
0Critical0High10Medium10Low10Informational20 of 30 resolved
All 30 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Inconsistent Withdrawal Parameters Due to Post- Calculation Update of GMtokens In the genericInvestmentLogic function, the variables minLongTokenAmount and minShortTokenAmount are calculated based on the value of GMtokens.
Medium fixed 6.2.2Potential Risk in Handling Large Redemption, When Requests Exceeding Available Balance The redeem function within the contract attempts to handle redemption requests where the requested assets exceed the currentBalanceAvailable.
Medium fixed 6.2.3Potential Risk in Handling Large Withdrawal Requests, When Exceeding Available Balance The withdraw function in the contract attempts to handle withdrawal requests where the requested assets exceed the currentBalanceAvailableToUser.
Medium fixed 6.2.4Lack of Flash Loan Callback Verification in _executeFlashloan Function of GMXv2Lib Library The function _executeFlashloan is designed to request flash loans from the Aave Lending Pool, expecting a callback to executeOperation within the same contract.
Medium fixed 6.2.5Potential Hash Collision in status Function Due to abi.encodePacked() Usage The function constructs two strings, str1 and str2, using abi.encodePacked() with various dynamic arguments derived from contract state variables and external calls. These strings are then concatenated again using abi.encodePacked().
Medium acknowledged 6.2.6Precision Loss Due to Division Before Multiplication in GMXv2strategyReader Contract Solidity's integer division truncates any remainder, potentially leading to precision loss when division is performed before multiplication.
Medium acknowledged 6.2.7Insufficient Liquidity Handling in Withdrawal and Redemption Functions of FijaVault2Txn contract Issue Identification: The contract's withdraw and redeem functions attempt to fulfill requests even when the requested amount surpasses the available balance (currentBalanceAvailableToUser for withdrawals and currentBalanceAvailable for…
Medium acknowledged 6.2.8Vault Deposits Can Be Front-run The vault implementation is forked from an older version of OpenZeppelin’s ERC4626 source
Medium acknowledged 6.2.9Unspecified Size Of Uint Variables The current implementation contains many uint variable definitions without specifying the actual size of the variable. This can lead to suboptimal gas usage or unintended behavior.
Medium fixed 6.2.10Improper Access Control The current implementation of the smart contract centralizes a lot of control and governance in the owner and governance roles.
Medium fixed 6.2.11Prevalence of Magic Numbers in Codebase Compromises Maintainability The codebase contains numerous instances where "magic numbers" are directly used within function logic.
Low fixed 6.2.12Missing Zero Address Validation in GMXv2strategyReader Constructor The constructor of the GMXv2strategyReader contract takes two address parameters, coreStrategy_ and asset_, and assigns them to state variables without checking if they are the zero address.
Low fixed 6.2.13Missing Event Emission in setContract Function of GMXv2strategyReader Contract The setContract function allows updating the address associated with a given key in the _contracts mapping.
Low fixed 6.2.14Multiple Reads of Storage Variables in GMXv2strategyReader Contract The Solidity compiler does not automatically cache storage reads to memory for subsequent accesses within the same function call.
Low acknowledged 6.2.15Update Required for Math Library Usage As detailed in OpenZeppelin's pull request #4455 revises the Rounding enum within the Math library.
Low acknowledged 6.2.16Unspecified Variable Visibility Many global variables are missing visibility modifiers. In Solidity, if you omit the visibility modifier for a state variable, it will default to "internal".
Low fixed 6.2.17Unclear Variable Value The updateStrategy function, updates the underlying strategy, resets the values for strategy implementation address and propose time. However, the proposed time is set to a magic number value not indicating its purpose.
Low fixed 6.2.18Improper Input Validation In the code of the smart contract, there is a lack of proper validation for the input parameters of the deposit, withdraw, and redeem functions.
Low fixed 6.2.19No Check for Contract Existence at Address The contract does not check whether a contract actually exists at the strategy address before calling its functions, which might lead to failed calls if there is no contract at the specified address.
Low acknowledged 6.2.20Missing Checks For Zero Address In Whitelisting Operations The _addAddressToWhitelist function does not check if the provided address is the zero address. It's generally a good practice to prevent the zero address from being added to the whitelist, as this address is often used to burn tokens.
Low fixed 6.2.21Potential Manipulation of Execution Fee Calculation in ETH Deposits The smart contract's deposit function calculates the execution fee as the difference between msg.value and the amount of ETH specified as assets.
Informational fixed 6.2.22Redundant Check for Zero Assets in Deposit Function Despite Modifier The deposit function includes a redundant check for assets == 0 within its logic, even though the function already employs a nonZeroAmount(assets) modifier designed to revert any transactions where the assets amount is zero.
Informational acknowledged 6.2.23Redundancy in Asset Calculation redeem Function The redeem function within the contract redundantly calculates the assets variable in both conditional branches of an if-else structure, leading to unnecessary code duplication.
Informational fixed 6.2.24Missing Struct Packing In Solidity, structs are packed into storage slots. A storage slot is 32 bytes in size, which means that if a struct fits entirely within a storage slot, it will consume only one slot.
Informational fixed 6.2.25Magic Numbers The current implementation contains several magic numbers on the first glance, making the code harder to understand and to maintain in the future. Solidity offers functions and alias to enhance readability of numbers significantly.
Informational fixed 6.2.26Misleading Variable Name The internal variable PRECISION_30 implies that it has 30 zeros, but the actual value has 36 zeros. This can lead to confusion during development and to unintended behavior.
Informational fixed 6.2.27Missing Immutable Modifier Variables should be declared as immutable in Solidity when their values are known and will not change after deployment. This improves gas efficiency, enhances security, and provides clarity in
Informational acknowledged 6.2.28Redundant Payable Conversion The current implementation has several references to access the contracts balance. While accessing the contract balance it converts the address to payable, which is not required and consumes additional gas while function execution.
Informational fixed 6.2.29Unused Return Value The _findAddrReplace function returns the potentially modified address array together with a boolean value, indicating, if the array was modified or not.
Informational fixed 6.2.30Missing Verification of Asset Addresses No verification of the supported assets addresses on contract deployment.
Informational acknowledged
About this engagement
A smart contract audit reviews on-chain code for flaws an attacker could exploit. Engineers trace how assets move through the contracts, check who can call privileged functions, and test the arithmetic, external calls and upgrade paths. Each finding is rated by severity, and fixes are re-checked before the final report.
How softstack runs smart contract auditsMethodology
Review process
Scoping and threat modelling
The commit hash is frozen and the attack surface is mapped: asset flows, trust assumptions, privileged roles and the external systems the code depends on.
Automated analysis
Static analysers sweep the full codebase to surface known weakness patterns, unreachable states and deviations from established conventions.
Manual code review
Independent engineers read the code line by line, concentrating on business logic, access control, arithmetic and the handling of external calls.
Adversarial testing
Property-based fuzzing and invariant tests attack the assumptions the protocol relies on, targeting states that ordinary unit tests never reach.
Reporting
Every finding is documented with a severity rating, its impact, the steps to reproduce it and a concrete remediation the team can act on.
Remediation verification
Submitted fixes are re-reviewed against the original finding, and the final report records the resolved state of each one.
Standards and references
- SWC RegistrySmart Contract Weakness Classification
- CWECommon Weakness Enumeration
FAQ
Fija was audited by softstack GmbH, a German Web3 security and software company based in Flensburg and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 by TÜV SÜD. softstack has completed 2 smart contract audits for Fija between July 2024 and January 2025. The published reports are linked on this page and in the softstack public audit archive.
2 separate reviews, the first in July 2024 and the most recent in January 2025. Each one covers its own scope and commit, and is listed individually on this page.
35 findings across all 2 reviews: 13 medium, 12 low and 10 informational. 23 of 35 were resolved or mitigated before the final reports.
Each report covers the code as it stood at the commit it names, the most recent in January 2025. Any code changed after that point is outside the reviewed scope.
Related audits
Browse all security auditsDisclaimer
This audit represents a point-in-time security assessment of the reviewed codebase and is intended for informational purposes only. While Softstack applies industry-standard security review methodologies, no audit can guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities, bugs, or other security risks. This report does not constitute financial, legal, regulatory, or investment advice, nor does it endorse the project, its business model, products, or services. Security is an ongoing process, and we strongly recommend conducting a new assessment following any material code changes or at least every 6 months to address newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and ecosystem developments.