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Web3 · Smart Contract Audit
Pantos Security Audits
softstack has completed 2 smart contract audits for Pantos in October 2024, reporting 22 findings in total (1 high, 10 medium, 8 low and 3 informational). Every report is published in the softstack public audit archive.
Key facts
- Client
- Pantos
- Audits completed
- 2
- Latest audit
- Chains
- Ethereum
- Languages
- Python
About the project
Pantos was a multi-blockchain token system designed to move digital assets between separate blockchain networks. It began as a research project of Bitpanda, the Austrian digital investment platform, and addressed interoperability between otherwise isolated chains. Its token contracts were deployed on Ethereum and other supported networks.
Case study
Findings
Combined across all 2 reviews softstack has completed for Pantos. Each report is broken out below.
Reports
Newest first. Every report covers its own scope and commit.
Service & Validator Node CODEBASE AND ARCHITECTURE security audit
0Critical0High5Medium5Low2InformationalScope
Source repositorygithub.com/pantos-io/servicenodeComponents reviewed
14 modules · 33 files- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/database/enums.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/database/access.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/database/__init__.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/database/exceptions.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/configuration.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/plugins/bids.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/plugins/__init__.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/business/plugins.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/business/base.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/blockchains/avalanche.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/blockchains/solana.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/blockchains/polygon.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/blockchains/__init__.py
- .8.1/pantos/servicenode/blockchains/bnbchain.py
All 11 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Error Handling in initialize_package If the initialize_package() function encounters an error, the session might still get initialized incorrectly. There is no rollback mechanism or logging to handle such cases.
Medium acknowledged 6.2.2Concurrency Bug in _create_instance Method The Pantos service node ecosystem uses various database operations to manage blockchains, contracts, bids, and transfers.
Medium fixed 6.2.3Non-Unique Constraints Handling There is a bug in the handling of UNIQUE_SENDER_NONCE_CONSTRAINT in the create_transfer function where, on encountering an IntegrityError, the session is rolled back but not restarted correctly.
Medium fixed 6.2.4Debug Mode in Production The debug mode for the Flask application is directly controlled by a configuration flag. This poses a security risk if the debug flag is inadvertently set to True in a production environment.
Medium fixed 6.2.6Broad Exception Handling in get_cross_blockchain_bids Method The get_cross_blockchain_bids method in the BidInteractor class uses a broad except Exception: block to capture and handle errors.
Low acknowledged 6.2.7Insufficient Log Message Context Current log messages, like _logger.info('Reading cross-blockchain bids from database'), are too generic. They do not provide enough information to pinpoint the exact operation being logged.
Low fixed 6.2.8Broad Exception Handling in update_node_registrations The method update_node_registrations is designed to update the service node registrations on all supported blockchains. Within this method, an except Exception block is used to catch and raise a custom NodeInteractorError.
Low acknowledged 6.2.9Error Handling during Table Initialization During the initialization of tables in the database, the code does not handle potential exceptions that may occur when adding records. This can lead to unhandled exceptions and potential instability during the table initialization process.
Low acknowledged 6.2.10is_main_module Function Might Not Reliably Detect All Celery Worker Processes The is_main_module function in the Celery initialization module might not reliably detect all Celery worker processes, depending on how they're started.
Low fixed 6.2.11Unsafe Assumption in read_transfer_nonce Function The read_transfer_nonce function in the module for creating, reading, updating, and deleting database records assumes that the query result will always contain at least one row.
Informational fixed 6.2.12Replace Assertions with Runtime Type Checking In entities.py, the CrossChainTransfer class uses assertions for type checking within the from_dict method. Assertions might be disabled in production environments, which could lead to critical type errors going unnoticed.
Informational acknowledged on-chain components for Ethereum and compatible blockchains smart contract audit
0Critical1High5Medium3Low1Informational4 of 10 resolved
Scope
Source repositorygithub.com/pantos-io/ethereum-contractsComponents reviewed
1 module- See the published report for the file list
All 10 findings
ID Title Severity Status 6.2.1Absence of Slashing Mechanism in Staking System The PantosRegistryFacet contract implements a staking system for both tokens and service nodes. However, it lacks a crucial component of many staking systems: a slashing mechanism.
High fixed 6.2.2Unsafe ERC Operation in PantosRegistryFacet.sol The PantosRegistryFacet.sol contract contains multiple instances of unsafe ERC20 token transfer operations.
Medium acknowledged 6.2.3Potential Division by Zero and Precision Loss in _transferFee Function The _transferFee function in the PantosForwarder contract performs divisions that can lead to potential issues: Division by Zero: The function does not check for zero values in the input parameters, which can cause the function to revert…
Medium acknowledged 6.2.4Potential Denial of Service Due to Unbounded Loops in Token and Service Node Unregistration The contract contains unbounded loops in the unregisterToken and unregisterServiceNode functions. These loops iterate over the s.tokens and s.serviceNodes arrays respectively.
Medium fixed 6.2.5Lack of Minimum Value Checks in Critical Parameter Setting Functions The PantosRegistryFacet contract contains several functions for setting critical system parameters.
Medium acknowledged 6.2.6Immediate Parameter Changes Pose Risk of System Instability The PantosRegistryFacet contract contains several functions that allow the owner to modify critical system parameters.
Medium fixed 6.2.7Decimals Function Not Part of ERC-20 Standard The decimals() function is not part of the original ERC-20 standard. It was introduced later as an optional extension through the IERC20Metadata interface. As a result, some valid ERC-20 tokens do not support this interface.
Low acknowledged 6.2.8Symbol Function Not Part of ERC-20 Standard The symbol() function is not part of the original ERC-20 standard. It was introduced later as an optional extension through the IERC20Metadata interface. Consequently, some valid ERC-20 tokens do not support this interface.
Low acknowledged 6.2.9Use of Single-Step Ownership Transfer Instead of Safer Two-Step Process The PantosBaseToken contract currently uses the Ownable contract from OpenZeppelin for ownership management. This implementation allows for a single-step ownership transfer, which can be less secure.
Low acknowledged 6.2.10Unnecessary Use of pragma abicoder v2 in PantosRegistryFacet.sol The PantosRegistryFacet.sol file includes the directive pragma abicoder v2. However, as of Solidity 0.6.0, the ABI coder v2 is considered non-experimental, and starting with Solidity 0.8.0, it is enabled by default.
Informational fixed
About this engagement
A smart contract audit reviews on-chain code for flaws an attacker could exploit. Engineers trace how assets move through the contracts, check who can call privileged functions, and test the arithmetic, external calls and upgrade paths. Each finding is rated by severity, and fixes are re-checked before the final report.
How softstack runs smart contract auditsMethodology
Review process
Scoping and threat modelling
The commit hash is frozen and the attack surface is mapped: asset flows, trust assumptions, privileged roles and the external systems the code depends on.
Automated analysis
Static analysers sweep the full codebase to surface known weakness patterns, unreachable states and deviations from established conventions.
Manual code review
Independent engineers read the code line by line, concentrating on business logic, access control, arithmetic and the handling of external calls.
Adversarial testing
Property-based fuzzing and invariant tests attack the assumptions the protocol relies on, targeting states that ordinary unit tests never reach.
Reporting
Every finding is documented with a severity rating, its impact, the steps to reproduce it and a concrete remediation the team can act on.
Remediation verification
Submitted fixes are re-reviewed against the original finding, and the final report records the resolved state of each one.
Standards and references
- SWC RegistrySmart Contract Weakness Classification
- CWECommon Weakness Enumeration
FAQ
Pantos was audited by softstack GmbH, a German Web3 security and software company based in Flensburg and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 by TÜV SÜD. softstack has completed 2 smart contract audits for Pantos in October 2024. The published reports are linked on this page and in the softstack public audit archive.
2 separate reviews, the first in October 2024 and the most recent in October 2024. Each one covers its own scope and commit, and is listed individually on this page.
22 findings across all 2 reviews: 1 high, 10 medium, 8 low and 3 informational.
Each report covers the code as it stood at the commit it names, the most recent in October 2024. Any code changed after that point is outside the reviewed scope.
Related audits
Browse all security auditsDisclaimer
This audit represents a point-in-time security assessment of the reviewed codebase and is intended for informational purposes only. While Softstack applies industry-standard security review methodologies, no audit can guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities, bugs, or other security risks. This report does not constitute financial, legal, regulatory, or investment advice, nor does it endorse the project, its business model, products, or services. Security is an ongoing process, and we strongly recommend conducting a new assessment following any material code changes or at least every 6 months to address newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and ecosystem developments.