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Web3 · Smart Contract Audit
Verida Security Audit
softstack completed a security audit of Verida's ARCHITECTURE & CODEBASE in November 2022, reporting 27 findings (2 high, 11 medium, 8 low and 6 informational). The full report is published in the softstack public audit archive.
Key facts
- Client
- Verida
- Completed
- Languages
- TypeScript, JavaScript
- Commit
02b7fa610aeb- Market cap
- $16,149 as of 2026-08-20
About the project
Verida is a decentralised database network for owning, storing and controlling private personal data, built on decentralised identity. It offers multi-chain interoperability and lets developers build applications around trusted storage, decentralised messaging and single sign-on. VDA, the native utility token, pays for storage and is staked by developers and storage providers.
Scope
Source repositorygithub.com/verida/verida-jsComponents reviewed
1 module- See the published report for the file list
Findings
0 of 27 findings resolved before the final report.
| ID | Title | Severity | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
5.2.1.1 | App Transport Security On Apple platforms, a networking security feature called App Transport Security (ATS) is available to apps and app extensions, and is enabled by default. | High | wont-fix |
5.2.1.2 | Update package.json packages to reduce vulnerabilities Severity Priority Score (*) Issue Breaking Change Exploit Maturity Why? Has a fix available, CVSS 5.3 Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) SNYK-JS-CSSWHAT-1298035 No No Known Exploit Why? | High | wont-fix |
5.2.1.3 | Update package.json packages to reduce vulnerabilities Severity Priority Score (*) Issue Breaking Change Exploit Maturity Why? Has a fix available, CVSS 6.5 Information Exposure SNYK-JS-NODEFETCH- 2342118 No No Known Exploit Why? | Medium | acknowledged |
5.2.1.4 | TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack Typically, modern TLS servers support old protocol versions and weak cryptographic algorithms for backward compatibility with older client and servers. | Medium | acknowledged |
5.2.1.5 | Unsecured Keychain Data iOS provides the Keychain for secure data storage. However, in several scenarios, the Keychain can be compromised and subsequently decrypted. | Medium | acknowledged |
5.2.1.6 | Exposed Pasteboard Data Both iOS and Android support copy/paste. Sensitive data may be stored, recoverable, or could be modified from the clipboard in clear text, regardless of whether the source of the data was initially encrypted. | Medium | acknowledged |
5.2.1.7 | Improper Session Management Once the user successfully logs in to the application with credentials, access tokens are generated by the server and assigned to the user. | Medium | acknowledged |
5.2.1.8 | MediaProjection: Android Service Allows Recording of Audio, Screen Activity Starting with Android 5.0, Google introduced the android.media.projection API which allows any third- party App to perform screen capture and screen sharing (fixed in Android 8). | Medium | acknowledged |
5.2.1.9 | Application Logs Android provides capabilities for an app to output logging information and obtain log output. Applications can send information to log output using the android.util.Log class. | Medium | acknowledged |
5.2.1.10 | Disabled SSL CA Validation and Certificate Pinning Certificate Pinning is the process of associating a host with their expected X509 certificate or public key. Once a certificate or public key is known or seen for a host, the certificate or public key is associated or 'pinned' to the host. | Medium | acknowledged |
5.2.1.11 | Literals should not be thrown It is a bad practice to throw something that’s not derived at some level from Error. Specifically, part of the point of throwing Errors is to communicate about the conditions of the error, but literals have far less ability to communicate… | Medium | acknowledged |
5.2.1.12 | Using http protocol is insecure. Use https instead. Clear-text protocols such as ftp, telnet or non-secure http lack encryption of transported data, as well as the capability to build an authenticated connection. | Medium | acknowledged |
5.2.1.13 | Disclosing technology fingerprints Disclosing technology fingerprints allows an attacker to gather information about the technologies used to develop the web application and to perform relevant security assessments more quickly (like the identification of known vulnerable… | Medium | acknowledged |
5.2.1.14 | XSS Injection via photo upload The API may be susceptible to general server vulnerabilities, which can lead to further attacks In the profile picture upload feature, the application is not properly verifying the type of file uploaded by the user. | Low | acknowledged |
5.2.1.15 | Sensitive Information Disclosure Data in transit or at rest needs to be secured from exposure using proper access controls and cryptography. | Low | acknowledged |
5.2.1.16 | Bytecode Obfuscation Generally, all mobile code is susceptible to reverse engineering. Some apps are more susceptible | Low | acknowledged |
5.2.1.17 | Using clear-text protocols is security-sensitive In order to view remote documents from an HTTP URL, cleartext network traffic support is required. | Low | acknowledged |
5.2.1.18 | Functions should not have identical implementations When two functions have the same implementation, either it was a mistake - something else was intended - or the duplication was intentional, but may be confusing to maintainers. CONFIDENTIAL | Low | acknowledged |
5.2.1.19 | Cognitive Complexity of functions should not be too high Cognitive Complexity is a measure of how hard the control flow of a function is to understand. Functions with high Cognitive Complexity will be difficult to maintain, it bloats programs and reduces readability. | Low | acknowledged |
5.2.1.20 | Dead or commented out code Programmers should not comment out code as it bloats programs and reduces readability. | Low | acknowledged |
5.2.1.21 | Default export names and file names should match By convention, a file that exports only one class, function, or constant should be named for that class, function or constant. Anything else may confuse maintainers. | Low | acknowledged |
5.2.1.22 | Unused Permissions An app might request a user for certain permissions, like access to SD card, contacts, social profiles, etc. which has not actually been invoked while the scan was running. | Informational | acknowledged |
5.2.1.23 | Unprotected Exported Activities Activities provide user interfaces. Activities are started with Intents, and they can return data to their invoking components upon completion. All visible portions of applications are Activities. | Informational | acknowledged |
5.2.1.24 | Track uses of "TODO" tags TODO tags are commonly used to mark places where some more code is required, but which the developer wants to implement later. Sometimes the developer will not have the time or will simply forget to get back to that tag. | Informational | acknowledged |
5.2.1.25 | Imports from the same modules should be merged Multiple imports from the same module should be merged together to improve readability. | Informational | acknowledged |
5.2.1.26 | "switch" statements should have at least 3 "case" clauses switch statements are useful when there are many different cases depending on the value of the same expression. | Informational | acknowledged |
5.2.1.27 | Store URLs in global config file Storing hardcoded URLs in plain codebase makes it hard to maintain. | Informational | acknowledged |
About this engagement
A smart contract audit reviews on-chain code for flaws an attacker could exploit. Engineers trace how assets move through the contracts, check who can call privileged functions, and test the arithmetic, external calls and upgrade paths. Each finding is rated by severity, and fixes are re-checked before the final report.
How softstack runs smart contract auditsMethodology
Review process
Scoping and threat modelling
The commit hash is frozen and the attack surface is mapped: asset flows, trust assumptions, privileged roles and the external systems the code depends on.
Automated analysis
Static analysers sweep the full codebase to surface known weakness patterns, unreachable states and deviations from established conventions.
Manual code review
Independent engineers read the code line by line, concentrating on business logic, access control, arithmetic and the handling of external calls.
Adversarial testing
Property-based fuzzing and invariant tests attack the assumptions the protocol relies on, targeting states that ordinary unit tests never reach.
Reporting
Every finding is documented with a severity rating, its impact, the steps to reproduce it and a concrete remediation the team can act on.
Remediation verification
Submitted fixes are re-reviewed against the original finding, and the final report records the resolved state of each one.
Standards and references
- CWECommon Weakness Enumeration
- OWASP Top 10The ten most critical web application risks
FAQ
Verida was audited by softstack GmbH, a German Web3 security and software company based in Flensburg and certified to ISO/IEC 27001 by TÜV SÜD. softstack completed a security audit for Verida in November 2022. The full report is linked on this page and published in the softstack public audit archive.
The review reported 27 findings: 2 high, 11 medium, 8 low and 6 informational. 0 of 27 were resolved or mitigated before the final report.
The review covered the code in github.com/verida/verida-js at commit 02b7fa6. The published report lists every file covered.
This report covers the code as reviewed in November 2022 at commit 02b7fa6. Any code changed after that point is outside the reviewed scope.
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Browse all security auditsDisclaimer
This audit represents a point-in-time security assessment of the reviewed codebase and is intended for informational purposes only. While Softstack applies industry-standard security review methodologies, no audit can guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities, bugs, or other security risks. This report does not constitute financial, legal, regulatory, or investment advice, nor does it endorse the project, its business model, products, or services. Security is an ongoing process, and we strongly recommend conducting a new assessment following any material code changes or at least every 6 months to address newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and ecosystem developments.